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I
Intercorporate Contracts
PURSUANT to a provision of the Federal Water Power Act of June 10,
1920,1 the Alabama Power Company, upon application to the Federal Power
Commission, was granted a license for the construction of a hydro-electric
project on the Coosa River in the State of Alabama. The project completed,
the Power Company in 1930 filed with the Power Commission an itemized
statement of the costs incurred in its realization. The Commission then
sought to determine from this statement the "actual legitimate. original
cost" of the project, as required by the Act. Of the $10,646,056 claimed,
$5,694,117 was allowed after a detailed examination of the licensee's records
and accounts. Further amounts were later disposed of by stipulation be-
tween the Commission and licensee,2 leaving for formal hearing contro-
l. 41 STAT. 1063 (1920), 16 U. S. C. § 791 (1926).
2. Opinion, at 3.
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versial accounts aggregating $4,605,735. The present opinion represents
the final disposition of these remaining items. The Commission rejected
therein the method of power-site valuation proposed by the licensee, based
upon the par value of stock given in exchange for the lands at a time of
merger with certain other companies and upon a capitalization of savings
resulting from hydro production. In its place was adopted a method
predicated upon the going market price of the lands at the time of their
original acquisition by the Power Company. The Commission also re-
jected a fee charged upon the construction work by an affiliate, the Dixie
Construction Company, allowing for the erection of the dam itself only
the direct and overhead expenses of the construction organization. Other
less seriously disputed items were allowed or modified. 3
Though constituting but a fraction of the space utilized in the presen-
tation of its opinion, the Commission's disposition of the question of the
Dixie Construction Company's fee strikes directly into what is at the
present time one of the gravest problems in public utility control-the
regulation of charges made by and between affiliated companies. This
fee, totalling $183,540, represented a 39 profit computed upon the direct
and overhead costs of the Dixie Construction Company, which held the
contract for the erection of the Mitchell Dam. The Alabama Power Com-
pany sought to have this item included in its capital account as one of the
legitimate costs of construction. Commissions in calculating cost of repro-
duction have uniformly allowed a contractor's profit on construction work;
in this they have been upheld by the courts.4 But in these cases the as-
sumption has been that there existed between utility and construction
company no connection whatsoever. In the present instance, however, the
Dixie Company was the wholly owned and controlled subsidiary of the
Power Companys and the Commission found in this difference a basis for
rejecting licensee's claim.
The intercorporate contract is a product of the holding company form
of centralized control. Through it the parent company renders to, or less
often, receives from, its subsidiaries certain services including construction
of equipment, managerial supervision, and engineering, accounting and
3. The following discussion is devoted to a consideration of the implications
of the Commission's action in disallowing the construction fee charged the
licensee by its affiliated company, with passing attention given to the items of
less controversial significance. A discussion of the problem of valuation of
power-site lands under the Federal Water Power Act will appear in the Decem-
ber issue of the Journal.
4. NAsH, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTLrrs (2d ed. 1931) 148. Licensee in
its original brief cites some of the court and commission cases sustaining this
general rule. Brief of Alabama Power Company, at 63.
5. During active construction the ownership of the Dixie Company was
transferred to the Winona Coal Company, a wholly owned and controlled sub-
sidiary of the Alabama Traction, Light and Power Company, -which in turn
held all the Power Company's common stock and through it exercised complete
control. See Opinion, 24.
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financial aid.6 For these services charges are made, of which some enter
the capital account and others the operating expenses of the benefited
company. But in the great majority of such agreements at the present
time, the charges are so set as to include a substantial profit element.1
Because of the community of ownership of subsidiary and parent, there
results an accrual of the profit to the same stockholders through two
separate channels.s It is this use of the intercorporate contract as a
double-profit-making device9 which has provoked criticism and comment.
The Power Commission predicated its rejection of the profit allowance
in the Mitchell Dam case upon the authority of commissions and courts,
under certain circumstances, to disregard separate corporate entities.' 0
This doctrine offers one possible legal basis for attack upon the abuses of
the intercorporate agreement."' On the basis of the tests which courts have
set up12 for the application of this rule to specific factual situations, it
6. The instant case is one in which the parent secured certain services from
its controlled subsidiary. By far the more usual situation is that where the
holding company performs services for its subsidiaries.
7. Two large holding companies have recently, however, abandoned manage-
ment service contracts as a source of profit. They are the Niagara Hudson
Power Corporation and the Commonwealth and Southern Corporation, both
parts of the United Corporation system. See MOODY'S MANUAL OF PUBLIO
UTILITIES (1930) 1557. The Commonwealth and Southern Corporation con-
tinues, on the other hand, to do a profitable business with its own subsidiaries
with respect to construction work. BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, Tim HOLDING
COMPANY (1932) 137, note.
8. Under the more usual arrangements where the parent organization per-
forms the services, the holding company secures the profit once through the
direct payment made by the subsidiary for the services and again through the
inclusion of the charge in the subsidiary's accounts and its consequent con-
sideration in the fixation of the latter's earnings, out of which it pays dividends
on its common stock held by the parent company. In an arrangement like that
in the Mitchell Dam case, the profit accrues to the parent organization by way
both of the dividends paid by the subsidiary on its profits and of the earnings
allowed on its own accounts, increased by the amount of the profit charge. For
an interesting early recognition that intercorporate contracts secure duplicate
profits to the dominant company, see Columbus v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 34 A. T. & T. Co. C. L. 970 (Ga. R. C. 1914).
9. The device has been dubbed the "milking of subsidiaries by parent com-
panies." There can be no doubt of its extended use in recent years. BONBRIGH1T
AND MEANS, op. cit. supra. note 7, at 153-154.,
10. Opinion, at 25.
11. A committee of the National Association of Railroad and Public Utility
Commissioners has expressed the opinion that this doctrine offers a solution
for the whole problem of regulation of holding companies. PRoc. NAT. Asso.
R. AND P. U. COMMISSIONESS, Forty-first Annual Convention, 1929, 567. But
cf. the discussion and citations, pp. 69, 70, infra.
12. "Identity of stockholders, identity of officers, the manner of keeping books
and records, the methods of conducting the corporate business as a separate
concern or as a mere department of the other concern, may be evidential facts
to be considered . . . " Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary
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appears that the Commission's position is well taken. There existed a
significant interlocking of officers and directors between the Alabama Power
Company and the Dixie Company;13 there obtained a noticeable comming-
ling of accounting affairs during construction;14 and, although licensee
submitted evidence' 5 as to the advantages of separate incorporation of
the construction company, there was substantial evidence supporting the
Commission's view that the Dixie Company was "in substance a depart-
ment of licensee's own business, maintained during the construction of
this and other of its public utility projects with a view to obtaining emolu-
ments and profits not otherwise allowable under the law."10
But although available under these circumstances as a legal formula by
which profit could be denied on an intercompany agreement, it is extremely
doubtful that such a doctrine offers generally to commissions a solution
of the problem.' 7 The presumption lies in favor of recognizing the sepa-
rate entities, and the type of evidence required by the courts 18 to overcome
this presumption cannot be found in the more common intercorporate re-
lationships, in which domination shades into coordination,1 0 and intent
Corporations (1925) 14 CALIF. L. REv. 12, 18. Identity of officers has been
given significant weight in two recent cases. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v.
Moynihan, 38 F. (2d) 77 (N. D. Ill. 1930); State cz reL Daniel v. Broad River
Power Co., 157 S. C. 1, 153 S. E. 537 (1929). As to manner and method of
conducting the two interrelated businesses, compare the latter case with Berkey
v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58 (1926), relied upon by
licensee. Whether or not the fiction has been used as an evasive device must
necessarily be determined from the general factual evidence in each case. Thus,
compare Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic and Com-
merce Association, 247 U. S. 490 (1918) with Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Co.,
supra.
13. FEDERAL PowER ComuIssION, PRELihIINARY ACCOUNTING REPRnT OI
ACTUAL LEGITIMATE INVESTMENT IN ORIGINAL MITCHELL DAMI PRoJECT, No.
82, ALABAMA PowEn COMPANY, LICENsEE, EXHIBIT A.
14. Id. at 15-16.
15. Brief of Alabama Power Company, at 52 et seq.
16. Opinion, at 25. Of evidential significance in this regard was the fact
that Mr. Thurlow, as Vice President and Executive Officer of the construction
company, prepared the Dixie's bid and later, as Chief Engineer of the Alabama
Power Company, passed upon this bid along with the others submitted. PnE=-
INARY ACCOUNTING REPORT, 6.
17. See Greenlaw, The Regulation of Holding Companies (1930) 14 AcAD.
OF PoL. SCI. PRoc. 108; Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 809, 811.
18. "It cannot be too strongly emphasized that mere identity of stockholders
per se does not operate to destroy the distinct corporate existence of two cor-
porations . . . It must further appear by clear and convincizg evidence that
the corporation created is only an adjunct of the business of its ereator,-a mere
agency, or instrumentality, through which it acts,-a mere business department,
or bureau, so to speak." (Italics supplied) Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corpor-
ate Entity (1912) 12 COL. L. REV. 496, 504.
19. This distinction between domination and coordination is recognized by
Ballantine. Ballantine, supra note 12, at 17. The distinction was clearly made
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to circumvent prevailing legal restrictions and obligations is not evident.-"
In one case,21 it is true, the employment of the doctrine in an attack upon
the intercorporate contract which the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company has with its various subsidiaries, was, in the main, successful.
22
Yet the significance which has been attributed to this case is unmerited.
The decision was almost completely devitalized by its later modification,
2 3
and was expressly rejected in a collateral case tried in a federal court
2 4
and involving the same litigants. But its importance is most vitiated by
another contemporaneous case, involving a subsidiary of the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, which was appealed through the fed-
eral courts.25  In the district court, the city of Chicago20 urged strongly
that the Illinois Company's bill for injunction against the Illinois Commerce
Commission be dismissed on the ground that the real party plaintiff was
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. In support, there was
introduced an array of evidence purporting to show such a domination
of the local company as to render it but a mere instrumentality of the
parent. Yet the court found the evidence insufficient
27 to justify a dis-
in Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Moynihan, supra note 12, which is discussed
in the text infra.
20. Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., supra note 12, is illustrative of the
usual situation where no clear evidence of intent on the part of the controlling
company to evade its obligations is apparent from the parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship.
21. People ex rel. Potter v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 246 Mich. 198, 224
N. W. 438 (1929). The case was brought by the State in the form of a quo war-
ranto proceeding to oust the Michigan Company of its franchise on the ground
that the American Telephone and Telegraph Company was actually conducting
the business in Michigan, with the result that the Michigan Company had violated
its franchise.
22. The ouster granted was partial only, relating alone to the right of the
subsidiary to have credit in the computation of its rates for contract payments
made to the-parent.
23. People ex rel. Attorney General v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., P. U.
R. 1929E, 27 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1929). 'By the modification, the Michigan Com-
pany was allowed, upon the making of due proof, to have included in the
computation of its rates "the reasonable value of the services rendered and
facilities furnished by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company." To
allow reasonable value seems to destroy the whole advance made under the
original decision.
24. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Odell, 45 F. (2d) 180 (E. D. Mich. 1930).
The question of payments under the Bell contract was here raised through the
petition of the Michigan Company for an increase in rates.
25. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Moynihan, supra note 12, rev'd (on grounds
not here relevant), Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133 (1930).
26. The city was permitted to intervene.
27. The evidence offered included annual reports, letters, circulars and
bulletins of the American Company intending to show that the Illinois Com-
pany was a mere agency with no will of its own, and oral testimony as to
alleged instances of dictation. The court found this insufficient mainly on the
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regard of the separate entities, and in this was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Smith v. Iliwis BeU Teleplwne Co.2 8  This case seems conclu-
sively to indicate the inadequacy of the disregard-of-corporate-entity
doctrine as a basis for control 29 in those instances of parent-subsidiary
relationship where the abuse of the intercorporate contract is greatest.2 0
The Solicitor's brief31 for the Commission in the instant case indicated
as a possible basis for regulatory control not only the power just discussed,
but also the authority of commissions to disallow unreasonable charges
to operating expenses or the capital account. Commissioner McNinch, in
his concurring opinion, recognizes this authority as a separate power
offering another possible method of control. The majority of the Com-
mission, however, make no mention of it in this connection, 2- and licensee,
in its brief,3 3 confuses the concept with the entity doctrine. But certainly
there exists this independent power of commissions to determine upon the
reasonableness of utility charges, and it seems to afford a much more
promising legal basis for the accomplishment of adequate control. Well-
recognized in law,3 4 it is essential to effective regulation under present
basis of other evidence tending to show that the two corporations were co-
ordinating their activities to produce a unified national service. Thus was the
fine line drawn between domination and coordination. See note 19, supram Lack
of identity of officers and directors was also of weight. See note 12, supra.
28. 282 U. S. 133, 143, 144 (1930).
29. The inadequacy of the doctrine is shown from another angle in the
judicial history of a case often cited in its support, Ohio Mining Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission, 106 Ohio St. 138, 140 N. E. 143 (1922) See Southern Ohio
Power Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 110 Ohio St. 246, 143 N. E. '00 (1924).
From this it appears that a separation of ownership could be secured sufficient to
defeat the doctrine, and yet there remain a situation wherein the same objection-
able use of intercorporate contracts would be possible.
30. Although the most significant decision in this regard by the Supreme
Court, it is not alone, for the Court had earlier indicated that membership
in the American Telephone and Telegraph Company does not carry with it the
loss of an independent corporate entity. Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co., 259 U. S. 318 (1922); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 262 U. S. 276 (1923). These decisions, moreover, had
defeated a very determined attack by the Maryland Commission upon the
relations between the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and its
subsidiary in Maryland. Public Service Commission v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1925B, 545 (Md. P. S. C. 1924). The Commission's
contention that the separate identities should be disregarded was rejected by
a federal court on the basis of the two Supreme Court decisions above cited.
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Whitman, 3 F. (2d) 938, 957 (D. Md.
1925).
31. Brief for the Commission, 45-47.
32. This is undoubtedly to be explained, however, by the fact that the ma-
jority felt it unnecessary to resort to the support of this power. The power
is referred to elsewhere in the opinion. Opinion, 26-27.
33. Brief of the Alabama Power Company, at 52 et scq.
34. Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339 (1892);
Tagg Bros. v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930); BONBRiGHT AND MEANs,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 215.
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methods. 35 The action of the Commission in the present case in examining
the cost assigned to various items by the licensee in its cost statement,
allowing the amounts stated in some instances while reducing them in
others, is illustrative of the common exercise of this power by commissions.
Entries in the capital account for certain technical advice rendered in
connection with the project, and a general administration account cover-
ing the estimated expense of departments and officers of the Power Com-
pany incurred in connection with supervision and inspection of construc-
tion, were taken at the figure set by licensee, the Solicitor for the Com-
mission having found that they were reasonable. 80 Accounts covering
taxes and interest during the construction period, and electric power fur-
nished by licensee to the Dixie Company for construction purposes were
modified. With regard to the first of these, the Commission merely fol-
lowed the established practice of the Interstate Commerce Commission and
state commissions which recognize two necessary construction periods,
one preliminary and the other actual, and on this basis seek to determine
from all material facts what is a reasonable length of time for which
interest and taxes should be allowed on non-revenue-producing property
necessarily tied up in the creation of the project.37
The question with regard to electrical energy sold to the Dixie Company
was whether the amount to be allowed as payment to licensee for this cur-
rent should be calculated at the out-of-pocket costs to the latter or whether
it should include a proportionate share of licensee's total overhead. What
is a proper allowance to be made in such a case must be determined from
the relevant facts. If the rates of a utility have been set by a regulatory
body with reference to an estimated available market in which there is
not included possible sales to subsidiaries, then the overhead of the sys-
tem has been fully allocated to other purchasers and subsequent sales to
controlled companies cannot properly be charged for at more than direct
out-of-pocket costs. If, however, possible sales to subsidiaries have been
considered in the estimate made of the market available, then an allocated
share of overhead should be allowed in the charge when any such sales
are later made. Apparently there was no evidence in this case as to which
procedure had been followed by the Alabama Public Service Commission
in setting the rates of the Alabama Power Company. However, the as-
sumption of the Solicitor for the Commission that licensee's construction
jobs, were not included in the estimate of available market is supported by
the general practice of commissions in excluding such possibilities when
estimating probable market demands. The Commission seems justified,
under the circumstances, in relying upon the assumption of the Solicitor
and allowing as a charge for energy only the amount of the direct increment
costs to licensee incurred by reason of its generation of this additional
power.
35. See the statement in Re Cambridge Home Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1930E,
65, 86 (Ohio P. U. C. 1930).
36. See Brief for the Commission, 50-54, 62.
37. Re Texas Midland Railroad, 75 I. C. C. 1, 155-156 (1918); Re Idaho
Power Co., P. U. R. 1923B, 52, 72-74 (Idaho P. U. C. 1922).
[Vol. 42
But this power of commissions is not unlimited; they cannot disregard
expenditures actually made unless there has been an evident failure on
the part of the company's officers to exercise proper business prudence. 9 In
the case of purchases of commodities and services, whether or not proper
discretion had been exercised seemed to be best capable of determination
by looking into what other corporations were paying for like purchases
and what it would have cost the company to have secured them from other
possible sources. Hence there developed this market value test of reason-
ableness. With the advent of the public utility holding company, raising
the problem of the fairness of intercorporate charges, this same test seems
to have been generally carried over to the new situation and applied as it
had been in those cases where there had been no connection whatever
between buyer and seller.39 Later, the Supreme Court followed40 the
general tendency in regarding the fact of common ownership of both
parties to the contract as "not important" beyond requiring a somewhat
closer scrutiny of the situation.41 The feeling that the market value test of
reasonableness was satisfactory even under these peculiar circumstances
continued for the most part until very recently.42 However, not a few
88. See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262
U. S. 276, 289 (1923), citing from State Public Utilities Commission cx rel.
Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Electric Co., 291 Ill. 209, 234, 125 N. E. 891,
901 (1919).
39. Birmingham v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., P. U. R.
1919B, 791 (Ala. P. S. C. 1918); Re Rates and Charges of Telephone Com-
panies, P. U. R. 1920B, 411 (Ariz. C. C. 1919); Re Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co., P. U. R. 1921B, 516 (Ark. C. C. 1920); Re Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co., P. U. R. 1917B, 198 (Colo. P. U. C. 1917); Re City of Peoria
and Receivers of the Central Union Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1918E, 74 (Ill.
P. U. C. 1918); Re Central Union Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1920B, 813 (Ind.
P. S. C. 1920); Re Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1916C, 925
(Md. P. S. C. 1916); Re Michigan State Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1918C, 81 (Mich.
R. C. 1918); Charleston Commercial Club v. Missouri Public Utilities Co., 2
Mo. P. S. C. R. 311 (1915); Buck v. New York Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1921E,
798 (N. Y. P. S. C. 1921); Mangum v. Mangum Electric Co., P. U. R. 1916E,
764 (Okla. C. C. 1916); Re Uniform Telephone Rates, P. U. R. 1917D, 259
(Penn. P. S. C. 1917); Re Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., P. U. R.
1920F, 49 (Va. S. C. C. 1920); Re Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., P. U. R.
1921B, 97 (W. Va. P. S. C. 1920); Bogart v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., P. U. R.
1916C, 1020 (Wis. R. C. 1916). Contra: San Jose v. Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 4 Cal. R. C. R. 150 (1914); Columbus v. Southern Bell Telephone
& Telegraph Co., supra note 8; Re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., P. U. R.
1919D, 345 (Ore. P. S. C. 1919). In these three cases cost to the parent
company rather than value to the subsidiary was stressed as the dominant
factor.
40. Houston v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 259 U. S. 318 (1922);
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U. S. 276
(1923).
41. Houston v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 259 U. S. 318, 323 (1922).
42. ". . . the test seems to be whether the sum [paid to the parent
company] is greater than the operating company would be compelled to pay
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commissions were beginning to question the efficacy of such a test, con-
tending that because of the community of interests involved in intercor-
porate charges, the going market price paid by others was not indicative
of the reasonableness of such payments, which could be adequately deter-
mined only by reference to the cost to the selling company.43 A fuller
understanding in recent years of the implications of the public utility
holding company has given rise to a general conviction of the soundness
of this contention.44 The Supreme Court has twice indicated its abandon-
ment of the market value test.45 In the Smith case, involving the two-fold
problem of payments by Bell subsidiaries to the American Company for
services and to Western Electric for equipment, the Court held in effect
that, because of the common ownership of these companies, the reasonable-
ness of payments by the subsidiaries was not shown by a comparison of
those amounts with market value, but could only be determined after spe-
to independent agencies for the same services or commodities, or than it would
cost the operating company to supply the services through its own organization.
The thought seems to be that if the holding company receives for its services
or commodities furnished to its controlled subsidiary no more than the sub-
sidiary would have to pay for the same services or commodities under conditions
of competition in dealing with outsiders, the charge cannot be said to be un-
reasonable. . ." Lilienthal, The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Coi -
panies (1929) 29 Co1 L. Rnv. 404, 419. No attempt is 'here made to collect
the many court and commission cases in which this test was employed during
the period of time elapsing between the decision of the Federal Supreme Court
in the Houston case and its decision in the Smith case, discussed in the text,
infra.
43. Re Southern California Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1925C, 627 (Cal. R. C.
1924); Re Pickwick Stages System, P. U. R. 1928D, 310 (Cal. R. C. 1928); Re
Pickwick Stages System, P. U. R. 1928D, 604 (Cal. R. C. 1928); Re Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co., P. U. R. 1930C, 481 (Cal. R. C. 1929); Illinois Com-
merce Commission v. Chicago, P. U. R. 1924A, 213 (Ill. C. C. 1923); Re Indiana
Bell Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1924A, 1 (Ind. P. S. C. 1923); Public Service Com-
mission v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1925B, 545 (Md.
P. S. C. 1924); Re Michigan State Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1923A, 30 (Mich.
P. U. C. 1922); Re Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1923B, 112
(Neb. R. C. 1922); Re New York Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1925C, 767
(N. J. P. U. C. 1924); Re Dayton Power & Light Co., P. U. R. 1931A, 332 (Ohio
P. U. C. 1930); Re Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., P. U. R. 19261, 481
(Va. S. C. C. 1926); Re Wisconsin Fuel & Light Co., P. U. R. 1927E, 212 (Wis.
R. C. 1927); Re City Water Co. of Marinette; Re City Water Works Co. of Merrill,
both 30 Wis. R. C. R. 352 (1927). One federal court during this time also felt the
necessity of referring to cost in order to test the reasonableness of allowances
made for purchases from an affiliated concern in calculating cost of reproduction.
New York Telephone Co. v. Prendergast, 36 F. (2d) 54 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
44. The utility interests, however, seem for the most part to continue to
support the market value test. Insull, Is Control of Holding Companies Suji-
cient? (1930) 14 AcAD. OF POL. SCI. PROC. 81, 86. See also NASH, op. cit. Rupr
note 4, at 414-416. But of. note 7, supra.
45. Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133 (1930); Western
Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission, 285 U. S. 119 (1932).
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cific findings on the cost to, and profits of, the central organizations. 0 In
Western Distributing Company v. Public Service Commission, where pay-
ments by a subsidiary to Cities Service Company were in question, the
court reiterated its conclusion that a commission is entitled to know and
consider the real cost to a parent of services and commodities sold to a
subsidiary, and indicated more clearly its reasons for so holding. These
were that the unity of control and interest between buyer and seller create
a situation totally different from that where the two companies are "dealing
at arm's length" and gives a power "arbitrarily to fix and maintain costs,
as respects the distributing (i. e., the subsidiary) company which do not
represent the true value of the services rendered . . ., -7 Since the
decision in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company, courts and com-
missions have quite uniformly indicated a determination to test the pro-
priety of charges arising in interlocking organizations by considering the
cost and profit to the parent companies.48
From its nature, the regulatory power over reasonableness of operating
and capital account charges, unlike that of disregard of separate corporate
entities, was one not restricted in scope to instances of dominating parent
control. Rather, it was wholly independent of the degree of existing control
and thus capable of exercise in all the varied parent-subsidiary relationships
out of which were arising the practices sought to be curbed. Circumscribed
as it was by the market value test, however, it could be but of little avail.
Only because of its extension in the last few years has it come to offer a
promising legal basis for the adequate control of charges made under inter-
company contracts.49 But now there is added to its advantage of inclusive-
ness the fact that courts and commissions are thereby enabled to look
46. See the Wisconsin Public Service Commission's interpretation of the
significance of the Supreme Court's ruling, in Re Wisconsin Telephone Co.,
P. U. R. 1931E, 101, 119 (Wis. P. S. C. 1931).
47. Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission, 285 U. S. 119,
126-127 (1932).
48. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission,
P. U. R. 1931E, 222 (U. S. Dist. Ct. E. D. Mich. 1931) (sustaining the Michigan
Commission in its demand for evidence relating to the cost to Western Electric
of manufacturing equipment sold to subsidiaries); Re New Hampshire Gas &
Electric Co., P. U. R. 1931D, 225 (N. H. P. S. C. 1931); Re Columbus Gas &
Fuel Co., P. U. R. 1931C, 244 (Ohio P. U. C. 1931) (but cf. Re Warren Tele-
phone Co., P. U. R. 1932A, 416, 420); Re Wisconsin Telephone Co., supra
note 46.
49. The problem of securing a satisfactory legal basis for effective control
of intercorporate charges is not to be confused with that concerning the proper
governmental unit for exercising the control available. For some of the problems
involved in the question of whether or not federal regulation of holding com-
panies is necessary, see Lilienthal, Recent Developmnents in the Law of Public
Utility Holding Companies (1931) 31 COL. L. Rnv. 189, 205. Nor should the
problem here under discussion fail to be distinguished from that as to whether
or not abuses of the holding company other than excessive profit-making through




behind the intercorporate agreement to the cost and profit arising there-
under, and thus may maintain an effective restraint upon the use of this
profit device.
In what, howevei, is this restraint particularly to consist? Is all profi
to be disallowed or only what is deemed to be excessive profit? The de-
cision in the Mitchell Dan case, rejecting all profit and allowing only the
direct and overhead cost on the construction work performed by the Dixie
Company, raises this important problem. Although there has been ex-
pressed some belief to the contrary,50 it seems clear that the Supreme Court
under its new attitude has not adopted cost to the selling company as the
measure of reasonableness. 51 Nor have commissions equated reasonable-
ness to this standard to the extent often supposed. A study of the decisions
wherein they have departed from the market value test of propriety reveals
but few instances5 2 in which the amount of the payment allowed has been
limited to the direct and overhead cost to the company furnishing the
services or commodities. In the other cases,53 though the language may
seem to indicate as much, 54 there has been no such limitation attempted.5
One criticism of the adequacy of commission power over the reasonableness
of operating expenses and additions to the capital account as a satisfactory
legal basis for control of intercompany charges has been advanced. It is to
the effect that the commission's power to disallow unreasonable charges cannob
prevent a utility company from paying an excessive amount to its holding
company and thereby weakening its credit position. BONDRIGHT AND MEANS, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 181-182.
50. Comment (1931) 19 CAL. L. Rav. 431, 438; Comment (1931) 40 YALD
L. J3. 809, 814.
51. This is the interpretation placed upon the Supreme Court's decisions
by Commissioner McNinch in his concurring opinion in the instant case. Opinion,
at 53. The same interpretation is to be found in Bonbright and Means, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 217; Lilienthal, supra note 49, at 197-198; Michigan Boll
Telephone Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, supra note 48; Re Wis-
consin Telephone Co., supra note 46; Comment (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV. 463, 460,
52. Columbus v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra note 8; San
Jose v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra note 39; Re Pickwick Stages
System (two cases); Re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.; Re Indiana Bell
Telephone Co.; Re Michigan State Telephone Co., all supra note 43.
53. Re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra note 39; notes 43 and 48,
supra.
54. The confusion as to the actual holdings in these decisions seems to arise
both from the uncritical use by commissions of the term cost and from their
efforts to solve the distinct though related problem of determining whether or
not payments calculated upon bases which in themselves have no meaning,
e.g. certain percentages of gross revenues, can be substantiated by evidence of
actual services performed or commodities furnished. The distinction between
this problem and the one under discussion, viz. that of determining whether
or not the amounts actually paid on whatever the basis of charging employed
are reasonable, is indicated in Lilienthal, supra note 42, at 416, 419. Re Tucson
Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., P. U. R. 1922C, 658 (Ariz. C. 0. 1922),
sometimes cited as a cost case, actually involved this related problem.
55. A few decisions are in such form that it is difficult to determine the
position which the commission intended to t~ke. Re New Hampshire Gas &
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This is true even of the decisions of the Wisconsin Commission, which has
many times been cited50 as one equating charges to costs. Thus in those
instances where the Commission has acted upon the precise question of
the reasonableness of sums actually paid under intercompany agreements,
though holding that charges, in order to be considered reasonable, should
bear a "close relation to the cost of the holding company of performing
the service,"57 it has merely declared that "a fair share of the economies"
arising out of integrated control should be passed on to the consumer.ZS
It is in those cases in which the Commission is insisting upon referring to
cost as proof that services or commodities have actually been supplied under
these contracts,59 that language is employed which seems to commit the
Commission to cost as the test of reasonableness.0 0 In recent years, only
California appears to have made any outright adoption of this measure.0 '
The Commission of that state has iterated a policy of refusing to allow
a construction company "to profit at the expense of a public utility when
the construction company controls the public utility or is owned or con-
trolled by the same interests which own or control the utility. ' 62  It is
clear, then, that there have been but few attempts to set up cost as in
Electric Co., supra note 48; Public Service Commission v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Telephone Co., supra note 30.
56. See, e.g., Wright, Management Fees of Public Utility Holding Com-
panies (1930) 6 JouR. LAND AND PUBLIC UTILrrY EcoN. 415, 419; NASH, Op.
cit. supra note 4, at 413.
57. Re Wisconsin Fuel & Light Co., supra note 43, at 214; Re City Water
Co. of Marinette; Re City Water Works Co. of Merrill, both supra note 43.
58. Re Wisconsin Telephone Co., supra note 46, at 118. Italics the Com-
mission's. The attitude of the Commission here is especially significant in that
it was expressed after, and represents an interpretation of, the Smith case.
59. See note 54, supra. The Wisconsin Commission itself clearly recognizes
the two distinct problems raised in these cases. See its opinion In Re Wisconsin
Fuel & Light Co., supra note 43.
60. Re Wisconsin Telephone Co., 23 Wis. R. C. R. 351 (1925); Re Wisconsin
Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1927A, 581 (Wis. R. C. 1926); Re St. Croix Valley
Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1929B, 597 (Wis. R. C. 1929); Re Wisconsin Telephone
Co., Decisions U-3683, U-3884, and U-3900 (Wis. R. C. 1930).
61. As indicated in note 55, supra, the New Hampshire Commission has
recently shown what may perhaps be a tendency toward the adoption of the
cost basis.
62. Re Pickwick Stages System, 30 Cal. R. C. R. 761, 763 (1927); Ro
Pickwick Stages System, P. U. R. 1928D, 310; Re Pickwick Stages System,
P. U. R. 1928D, 604 (both Cal. R. C. 1928). Later this policy was enforced
with respect to payments made by the Pacific Coast Bell subsidiary to Western
Electric. Re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra note 43. There have ap-
parently been no appeals taken from these decisions. Thus the California
Commission seems to fully continue in the policy which it early adopted in
San Jose v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra note 39. But cf. its
statement in Re Southern California Telephone Co., suprm note 43, to the effect
that cost is one factor to be considered.
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itself the test of reasonableness. Rather, commissions and courts have
either sought only to restrict the profit on intercorporate contracts to a
reasonable sum 63 or have merely insisted upon the production of cost data,
leaving unindicated as yet their position on the question of the allowance
or disallowance of a profit increment. 4
This question is of significance because it involves the problem of the
reward of efficient management. It has been urged that if parent organ-
izations are prevented from making charges to their subsidiaries which
will include a profit over and above the cost to them of the services rendered
or the commodities delivered, they will be under no inducement to realize
the economies possible through centralized organization.0 5 Thus counsel
for the Illinois Bell Telephone Company, in answer to the contentions
pressed by the City of Chicago in the Smith case, 0 declared on oral argu-
ment that "I see no reward [under such a theory] for management then.
I see no reason why a company should attempt to give the best service at
the lowest cost."' 67 And this view has been regarded as persuasive by
other than utility representatives.68 The problem will be recognized as
but an old one in new form,69 for the whole theory of utility regulation
has often been criticized 70 on the ground that it tends to induce ineffi-
ciency, since the utility "may feel that its rates will be adjusted to give
it the same rate of return whether it makes improvements or not, so that
63. Re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra. note 39; Re Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co.; New York Telephone Co. v. Prendergast; Re Chesapeake
& Potomac Telephone Co.; Re Wisconsin Fuel & Light Cu.; Re City Water
Co. of Marinette; Re City Water Works Co. of Merrill, all suprw note 43; Re
Wisconsin Telephone Co., supra note 46.
64. Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133 (1930); Western
Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission, 285 U. S. 119 (1932); Illinois Com-
merce Commission v. Chicago; Re New York Telephone Co.; Re Dayton Power &
Light Co., all supra note 43; Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Michigan Public
Utilities Commission; Re Columbus Gas & Fuel Co., both supra note 48.
65. That there are substantial economies possible under the holding company
form of business integration is generally acknowledged as to direct holding
company control of operating subsidiaries. Flynn, Pyramiding of Holding
Companies (1932) 159 ANN. Am. ACAD. 15; Hedge, A Defense of the Holding
Company, id. at 7; Ruggles, Regulation of Electric Light and Power Utilities
(1929) 19 Am. EcoN. REV. (Supp.) 179; Sickler, Regulation of Public Utility
Integration on the Pacific Coast (1930) 6 JouR. LAND AND PUBLIC UTILITY EcoN.
51. But cf. Bonbright, The Evils of the Holding Company (1932) 159 ANN.
Am. AcAD. 1.
66. See p. 70, supra.
67. Cited in Lilienthal, supra note 49, at 204.
68. Bonbright, "Recent Developments in the Law of Public Utility Holding
Companies"-A Comment (1931) 31 COL. L. RaV. 208; Wright, supra note 56.
69. Cf. Bonbright, supra note 68, at 211.
70. See BAUER, EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1925) 328;
CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1926) 384-385; Naw YORK STATE Com-
mISSION ON RLVIsION OF' THE PUBLIC SERVICE CoMmIssIoNs LAWS (1930) VoL.
I, Recommendations of Commissioners 383.
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the public will get the entire benefit" 7' That problem is as to whether
efficient management does in reality find its own reward or whether a
definite reward must be allowed directly in the process of regulation. That
the latter is necessary has been the view taken by various writers on
economics,7 2 engineers,7 3 and commissions.74  On the other hand it has
been urged by some75 that no definite allowance need be made in regula-
tion for managerial reward, there being indirect sources of gain whereby
efficient management secures for itself ample recompense.70 These in-
centives are said to include the possibility of strengthening the credit
rating of securities through achieving greater stability of earnings, the
lack of a guarantee of earnings by the regulating authority,7 7 the fact
that earnings above the fair return may be retained by the utility,78 and
the probability that through voluntary rate reductions made possible by
71. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 70, at 385.
72. Ibid.; Ruggles, supra note 65; of. NEw YORK STATE ComiIIsSION ON
REVISION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE CO1MISSIONS Law, op. cit. supra note 70, at
383 et passim.
73. See the testimony of R. T. Livingston, consulting engineer of the Long
Island Lighting Company, NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE
PUBLIC SERVICE ComitssioNs LAw (1930) VOL. III, at 2414 ct seq., especially
p. 2422.
74. The commission cases in which a definite allowance has been made for
efficiency in management are collected in Spmul, GUMING PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
SERVICE REGULATION (1926) VOL. III, 97-111. See also SITrrH, THu FAIn RATE
oF RruRN IN PUBLIC UTILITY RxunLAr- oN (1932) 198; SMITH Am DoWLrmi,
CASES ON PUBLIC UT=ms (1926) 1081-1085. Cf. the statement of Chairman
Attwill of the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, Attwill, Wcarnewses
of the Valuation System (1932) 159 ANN. Ail. ACAD. 96, 97, and the remarks
of Mr. Justice Brandeis during the oral argument in the Smith case, cited in
Lilienthal, supra note 49, at 204, note.
75. Bauer, "Regulation of Electric Light and Power Utilitics"--Disuasion
(1929) 19 AM. EcoN. REV. (Supp.) 219, 222; SMITH, op. cit. supra note 74, at
73; Testimony of Judson C. Dickerman, public utility expert, Nnw YORK STATE
COMMISSION ON REVISION O THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMSSSIONS LAw (1930)
VOL. I, at 2423-2424.
76. The abandonment of profit charging by the Niagara Hudson Power
Corporation and (partially) by the Commonwealth and Southern Corporation,
discussed supra note 7, gives strength to this contention.
77. This factor is at the present time more significant in those cases where
fair value is taken as the rate base than in those where actual investment
constitutes the base, because of the present liberality of courts in determining
fair value. Cases, such as the instant one, where valuation is governed by the
provisions of the Federal Water Power Act clearly fall within the latter group.
41 STAT. 1064 (1920), 16 U. S. C. § 796 (1926).
78. Under a recapture provision or a provision for the payment of excess
earnings into a rate equalization reserve, this incentive would be absent. It
would thus not be present for utility organizations operating under the Federal
Water Power Act because of the provision therein for recapture of earnings




excellence in management, the volume of business can be expanded and a
situation created for the investment of new capital under advantageous
conditions. The adherence to either of these positions will raise unique
problems. Thus if cost is taken as the measure of reasonableness, the
situation will become extremely complicated in those instances where the
parent company has a working control of the subsidiary but does not own
a large proportion of the latter's stock. In the cases which have so far
been before the courts and commissions, especially those involving the
Bell system, stock ownership of the controlled subsidiary has been rela-
tively complete. But control and ownership need not be congruent7 9 and
indeed often are not,80 and under such circumstances the disallowance of
all profit on intercompany contracts would be unduly prejudicial to the
organization rendering the services or furnishing the commodities.81 On
the other hand, if the position be taken that some direct allowance should
be made for efficiency, the question arises as to the proper method. Where
attention has been directed to the problem of encouraging operating com-
pany management, as distinct from the holding company type of manage-
ment, by far the usual method suggested and employed has been that of
79. To effect absolute control a parent company need hold but a fraction
over 50 per cent of the outstanding voting stock of the subsidiary. Yet a
holding company can in most cases achieve a factual control just as effective,
with only a minority interest. This arises primarily from the fact that the
remaining voting stock is usually widely distributed among various share-
holders who have no unity of interest, and from the further fact that in some
instances friendly, though independent, interests have substantial holdings.
Thus Electric Bond & Share Co. has only minority interests in the subholding
companies through which it contracts with operating companies for financial,
managerial and engineering superIvision. See Federal Trade Commission,
Control of Electric Power Companies (1927) 69th Cong., 2d Sess., Sen. Doe.
213, at 7. Yet the Federal Trade Commission "has expressed a conviction,
which is generally sustained in the investment world, that Electric Bond &
Share Company does enjoy de facto control. . " BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 103.
80. The recently published study of the Federal Power Commission reveals
numerous instances in which the holding company has far less than a 100
per cent stock interest in the operating subsidiary. See Federal Power Com-
mission, Holding Company Control of Licensees of the Federal Power Com-
mission (1932). See also note 79, supra.
81. One possible solution is suggested. The objection to the allowance of
a profit increment being that it enables the stockholders of the parent company
to realize the profit twice over, to the extent that the fee charged would return
to the parent a second time it would be disallowed, but allowed to the extent
that it would not thus return. The relative amounts of stock owned by the
parent and by outside interests would be the determining factor. Thus assum-
ing that in the Mitchell Dam case the Alabama Power Company held but 40
per cent of the Dixie Company's stock, then 60 per cent of the fee charged
would be allowed as an item in the Power Company's capital account. The
criticism of such a proposal is its probable unworkability in situations of in-
volved intercorporate payments and complicated capital structures.
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making a differential allowance in the rate of return.82 This method has
been advanced as desirable for the rewarding of efficiency on the part
of holding company organizations S3 and perhaps its use would best enable
commissions intelligently to make an adequate, and at the same time not
excessive, allowance for this factor. Substantial criticism may, however,
be urged against itA 4 especially until more objective tests are available for
determining the differential to be employed.8 5
As between the two positions regarding the allowance or disallowance
of a profit increment in intercompany agreements, the Federal Power Com-
mission in the instant case elected the latter. Certainly the peculiar facts
and circumstances of this case, indicated earlier in this discussion,8 justify
the Commission in its decision. The question remains, however, as to the
proper disposition of the many cases involving the intercorporate contract
wherein the parent-subsidiary relationship more fully vindicates its ex-
istence.
THE FACKER CONSENT DECREE*
SINCE 1889 investigations of the large meat packers' have been frequent.
In response to public clamour, a Senate investigation 2 of the meat trust
was largely responsible for the passage of the Sherman Act.3 The first
court action taken by the Department of Justice against the big packers
was in 1902, when it secured a temporary injunction, made permanent
82. See notes 72, 73, and 74, supra.
83. Ruggles, supra note 65, at 191-192.
84. Bauer, supra note 75, at 221-222.
85. After an extensive study of the general problem of rewarding efficiency
in management, one writer concludes that liberality in the allowance of oper-
ating and capital account charges is preferable to the inclusion of a differential
in the rate of return. S IrrH, op. cit. supra note 74, at 199.
86. See p. 69, supra.
* Special acknowledgement is made of the valuable bibliographical assistance
given by Mrs. Madge E. Harkness of the Federal Trade Commission Library.
1. Throughout this article, whenever "big packers," the "Big Five" or the
"Big Four," or just the "packers" without qualification appears, reference is
had to Swift & Co., Armour & Co., Morris & Co., Wilson & Co. (Ine), and the
Cudahy Packing Co. In 1923 Armour & Co. absorbed Morris & Co. and the
packers became the "Big Four" instead of the "Big Five.'
2. VEsT REPORT, SEN. Doc. No. 829, Vol. 3, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1889).
The committee reported collusion in regard to (1) fixing prices of beef, (2)
division of territory and business, (3) division of certain public contracts and
(4) compulsion of retailers to buy their beef from the packers.
3. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1926).
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one year later,4 forbidding further violations of the Sherman Act and
specifically enjoining the further operation of the notorious Veeder pool.6
As a result of the temporary injunction and to circumvent its provisions,
the three principal members of the old pool immediately attempted to
effect a merger. Due to the withdrawal of support by Kuhn, Loeb & Co.,
who were to finance the deal, the merger fell through. Shortly thereafter
the National Packing Co. was formed, to which the various big packers
transferred certain of their subsidiary packing companies. The principal
officers of the big packers, the same men who had met in Veeder's office
to attend the manipulations of the old pool, could meet, as directors of the
new corporation, with small risk of contempt proceedings.
The next judicial action against the packers was the famous "immunity
bath" case7 where a verdict in favor of the defendant officers of the pack-
ing companies was directed in a criminal prosecution because certain of
the individual defendants had given information to the Commissioner of
Corporations in an inquiry into the prices of cattle and dressed beef in-
stituted by order of the House of Representatives.8 A further indictment
was returned against the Swift, Armour and Morris groups of defendants
in 1910 for their part in the organization and continued operation of the
National Packing Co. After claims of immunity 0 and demurrers 10 were
4. U. S. v. Swift & Co., 122 Fed. 529 (C. C. N. D. I1. 1903); aff'd, 190
U. S. 375 (1905).
5. Original decree, 196 U. S. 375, 393N (1905); perpetual injunction as modi-
fied by mandate of Supreme Court in 196 U. S. 375 (1905). See FnDiRmt TnADY
COMMISSION, 2 REPORT ON MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY 18. Representatives of the
leading packing companies met regularly every Tuesday afternoon, divided
the territory and apportioned the volume of business to be done by each, penal-
ties being levied when anyone of them exceeded his allotment in any territory.
Id., Summary, at 46-47.
6. Armour, Swift and Morris.
7. U. S. v. Armour & Co., 142 Fed. 808 (N. D. Ill. 1006). The Commissioner
of Corporations, whose duty it was to make this inquiry, had the power to
subpoena the books and correspondence of any individual or corporation where
such material was relevant to the inquiry and to subpoena witnesses for the
same purpose. This power was subject to the immunity statute immunizing
persons from prosecution on account of anything testified to in proceedings
under the Sherman Act. The Commissioner, however, did not subpoena any of
the defendants in this case but they voluntarily appeared before him. Judge
Humphreys held that the only object of the subpoena was to secure attendance
and it is superfluous when the witness is present without subpoena, and the
mere fact that the Commissioner of Corporations did have the power to force
the defendants to testify granted them immunity for acts to which they had
testified without testimonial compulsion.
8. H. R. Doc. No. 382, 58th Cong. 3d Sess., REPORT OF TIl Com1lIIsSIONEn
OF CORPORATIONS ON THE BEEF INDUSTRY (March 3, 1905); see Francis Walt-er,
The "Beef Trust" and the United States Government (1906) 16 EcoNo mo
JOURNAL 491.
9. U. S. v. Swift & Co., 186 Fed. 1002 (N. D. Il. 1911).
10. U. S. v. Swift & Co., 188 Fed. 92 (N. D. Ill. 1911).
overruled the defendants were acquitted, but threat of a civil suit resulted
in dissolution of the National Packing Co. and distribution of its assets
among the three stockholding packers.
In 1917 the President directed the Federal Trade Commission to in-
vestigate the meat packing industry, the Commission's report being pub-
lished in 1919.11 This report stated that the packers, together with their
subsidiaries and affiliates, not only had "a monopolistic control over the
American meat industry but have secured control similar in purpose, if
not yet in extent, over the principal substitutes for meat, such as eggs,
cheese, and vegetable-oil products, and are rapidly extending their power
to cover fish and nearly every kind of foodstuff. . . .The monopolistic
position of the Big Five'2 is based not only on the large proportion of the
meat business which they handle, ranging from 61 to 86 per cent1 3 in the
principal lines but primarily on their ownership, separately or jointly, of
stockyards, private refrigerator car lines, cold storage plants, branch
houses, and the other essential facilities for the distribution of perishable
foods . ..
"There are undoubtedly rivalries in certain lines among the five corpora-
tions. Their agreements do not cover every phase of their manifold ac-
tivities, nor is each of the five corporations a party to all the agreements
and understandings which exist. Each of the companies is free to secure
advantages and profits for itself so long as it does not disturb the basic
compact. Elaborate steps have been taken to disguise their real relations
by maintaining a show of intense competition at the most conspicuous
points of contact."' 4
Following the disclosures made by the Federal Trade Commission, the
Department of Justice in 1919, according to official announcements, was
11. F. T. C., REPORT ON THE MET PACKING INDUSTRY (1919).
12. Armour, Swift, Morris, Wilson and Cudahy.
13. In 1916 the big packers' percentage of the interstate slaughter, includ-
ing subsidiary and affiliated companies, was as follows: cattle, 82.2%; calves,
76.6%; hogs, 61.2%; sheep and lambs 86.45. There was only one independent
packer-Kingan & Co.-who slaughtered as much as one per cent of the inter-
state total of cattle, and only nine independents who slaughtered as much as
one per cent of the interstate total of hogs.
14. Supra, note 11, summary, at 31-32. The Commission stated that "the
power of the Big Five in the United States has been and is being unfairly and
illegally used to manipulate livestock markets; restrict interstate and inter-
national supplies of foods; control the prices of dressed meats and other foods;
defraud both the producers of food and consumers; secure special privileges from
railroads, stockyard companies and municipalities." p. 32. "Control of the
meat industry carries with it not only control of all kinds of fresh and pre-
served meats, but in addition a very great competitive advantage in more than
a hundred products and by-products arising in connection with their preparation
and manufacture, ranging in importance from hides and oleomargarine to
sandpaper and curled hair. In all these lines the Big Five's percentage of
control as compared with other slaughterers is greater even than the per-
centage of animals killed, because of the fact that many of the smaller packers
are not equipped or have been unable to use all their by-products." pp. 33-34.
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preparing to present to a Federal grand jury in New York evidence of a
combination in the meat packing industry in violation of the anti-trust
laws with a view to procuring an indictment. Negotiations with the De-
partment of Justice, initiated by the packers in the fall of 1919, resulted
in the suspension of the grand jury proceedings and the application to
the civil courts for a decree to which both parties consented. On February
27, 1920, the Attorney General filed suit in the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, alleging an unlawful combination and asking for
relief. By prearrangement, the case was not contested, and a consent decree
was entered on the same day that the petition was filed. By the terms
of this decree the five big companies 1r and certain subsidiary or affiliated
corporations, and certain individuals connected with the corporate defend-
ants, were enjoined and restrained from maintaining or entering into any
contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade, or
from monopolizing or attempting to monopolize any part of interstate
trade or commerce.
The defendants were required, among other things, to dispose of their
holdings in public stockyards, stockyard railroads and terminals; to dis-
pose of their interest in market newspapers and in public cold storage
warehouses except where necessary for their own meat products; to dis-
sociate themselves from the retail meat business; to discontinue using
and to allow no one else to use their facilities for the purchase, sale, dis-
tributing, etc. of certain commodities commonly referred to as "unrelated
lines" (consisting principally of wholesale groceries); to dissociate them-
selves from ownership of any capital stock in corporations engaged in
manufacturing, selling, distributing, or otherwise dealing in such unre-
lated commodities; to cease dealing in fresh milk or cream. Individual
defendants were enjoined from owning severally or collectively, more than
50 per cent of the voting stock of any corporation or a half interest or
more in any firm or association engaged in dealing in any manner in the
enumerated unrelated commodities.
A two year time limit was set for the fulfillment of the changes decreed.
The packer defendants consented to the decree upon the condition that their
consent would in no way constitute an admission, or the decree itself an
adjudication that the defendants had in fact violated any law of the United
States.16
The government by this decree subjected the packers to much greater
restraints than would have been possible in an injunction issued after a
15. Armour & Co., Swift & Co., Wilson & Co. (Inc.), Morris & Co., and the
Cudahy Packing Co.
16. The packers claimed in their answer to the government's petition that
they had violated no law and stated that they merely bowed to the will of the
people. The Attorney General claimed on the other hand that the, packers
made a complete submission to the government. It would seem that the state-
ment of the Attorney General was more reasonable and that the packers'
answer and consent to the decree practically amounted to a plea of nolo con-
tendere.
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litigated suit. If the suit had been contested no provisions could have
been inserted in the decree other than those which enjoined the illegal
practices of the defendants. The requirements of abandoning dealing in
unrelated lines, milk and cream, and engaging in retail trade, prohibitions
which proved most irksome to the packers, could not have been inserted
as there was no violation of the anti-trust laws in the packers' engaging
in these lawful businesses in a lawful manner.
From the haste with which subsequent attack on the decree was begun,
there is some indication that from the time the decree was entered the
packers intended to attack it. The first move was a request to the Attorney
General in 1921 by the California Co-operative Canneries to have the decree
modified. While this request was being considered by the Attorney Gen-
eral, the Southern Wholesale Grocers Association and the National Whole-
sale Grocers Association were granted leave, over the Attorney General's
objection, to intervene in any proceedings which might be had to modify
the consent decree. Thereafter, the Attorney General secured the appoint-
ment of an interdepartmental committee of three to consider the advis-
ability of modifying the decree. After hearing a large number of wit-
nesses, the committee declared that questions of such vital interest to the
public generally were matters which ultimately must be decided by the
court issuing the decree and recommended that the issues should not be
in any manner prejudged by the Attorney General.1 8 This position was
adopted by the Attorney General who, therefore, made no recommendation
to the court.
Accordingly, in 1922 the California Co-operative Canneries O brought
suit to intervene to have the decree vacated or modified in order to permit
Armour & Co. to engage in the unrelated lines upon the ground that the
decree interfered with its contract that Armour & Co. should market its
production. Intervention was denied by the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia, which was sustained by the U. S. Supreme CourtcO in 1929
after a contrary holding in the Court of Appeals of the District of Colum-
bia.21 Upon the motion of the California Canneries the trial court had
17. This committee was composed of one member selected by the Secretary
of Agriculture, one by the Secretary of Commerce and Mr. Herman J. Galloway,
Special Assistant to the Attorney General, who had been actively connected
with the case.
18. REPORT oF THE INTERDEPARTiNTAL CoIimrTrEE, Jan. 20. 1922, printed
as Exhibit B, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry, U. S. Senate, sLxty-seventh Congress, 2d session, at 14.
19. The record in the present case (p. 715) shows the close financial relation-
ship between California Canneries and Armour & Co. At the time of the
trial the California Canneries owed Armour & Co. over $1,400,000. In addition
Armour had guaranteed accounts on which California Canneries owed $350,000.
20. 279 U. S. 553 (1929).
21. 299 Fed. 908 (App. D. C. 1924). The Supreme Court held that, under
the Expediting Act of Feb. 11, 1903, 32 STAT. 823 (1903), 3G STAT. 854 (1910),
15 U. S. C. §§ 28, 29 (1926), requiring all suits in equity brought by the United
States under the anti-trust act to be appealed directly to the Supreme Court
from the trial court, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction.
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entered an order, dated May 1, 1925, suspending the further operation of
the consent decree until after a full hearing on the merits could be had.
While the litigation in this suit was pending, Swift and Armour moved in
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia that the consent decree
be declared void for lack of jurisdiction.22 From an order overruling these
motions, the petitioners took appeals to the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia, from which the case was certified to the U. S. Supreme Court.23
In 1928, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the certified case,
upholding the consent decree. It was held that an injunction against the
packers was proper, even though past wrongs had neither been proved nor
admitted, and that even if the court, having jurisdiction of the subject and
parties, had erred in deciding that there was a case or controversy, the
error could only have been reached by a bill of review or appeal and not
by a delayed motion to vacate.24
Having been unsuccessful in attacking the validity of the consent decree,
the packers now attempted, under a provision of the decree retaining juris-
diction of the cause for further proceedings, to show that a change of
conditions in the food industry had occurred and that the continued en-
forcement of the decree was unjust to the packers and not necessary to
the protection of the public. The instant suit was commenced in the Su-
preme Court of the District of Columbia in April, 1930, by petitions of
Swift and Armour 25 to modify the decree insofar as it (1) restrains the
packers from owning stockyards, market newspapers, terminal railroads,
etc., 26 and (2) restricts the use of their distributive facilities and restrains
22. The packers contended that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the
decree as it was void for want of factual basis, that as no determination was
made that defendants had violated the law, this being specifically denied by
them, the court had no jurisdiction under the anti-trust laws to render a
decree, that the decree was void in so far as it enjoined defendants from
following lawful occupations in a lawful manner (ie., engaging in the un-
related lines), and that consent cannot confer jurisdiction beyond the legal
power.
23. The Court of Appeals on January 3, 1927, dismissed the appeals for
want of jurisdiction (in view of the Expediting Act, 32 STAT. 823, 36 STAT. 854
15 U. S. C. §§ 28, 29) upon the motion of the United States. On January
31, 1927, on motion of Swift and Armour the Court of Appeals vacated its
order and restored the case for reargument upon the question of its jurisdiction
of the appeals and for argument on its jurisdiction to transfer the appeal to
the Supreme Court pursuant to § 238a of the Judicial Code (now repealed)
allowing transfer to the proper court of an appeal taken to the wrong court.
Thereafter the Courtl of Appeals certified to the U. S. Supreme Court questions
of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and of its
own jurisdiction. The U. S. Supreme Court, after hearing the argument on
the certificate, ordered up the entire record and after holding that the Court
of Appeals had no jurisdiction of the appeal decided the case as on transfer.
Infra, note 24.
24. Swift & Co. v. U. S., 276 U. S. 311 (1928).
25. Cudahy and Wilson did not enter into the suit to modify the decree.
26. The packers had been unable to dispose of their interests in the stock-
yards and terminal railroads at what they considered to be a fair price. By a
[Vol. 412
the packers from entering or continuing 2 7 the unrelated lines and all forms
of retail trade. The trial court refused to modify the restraints of part
(1) 28 above, but finding that there no longer was any danger to the public
welfare, removed the restrictions of part (2). The packers took no appeal
from the court's decision with reference to (1). So, aside from the question
of the jurisdiction of the court to modify the decree, the sole question be-
fore the U. S. Supreme Court 29 was whether the conditions of the meat
packing business and the wholesale grocery trade had changed sufficiently
since 1920 so that the danger of monopolistic control by the packers had
been removed and, therefore, the exclusion of the packers as competitors
in the general food industry had become injurious to the public and unjust
to the packers.
A proper understanding of the problem before the Court requires an
appreciation of the background of the packing industry and the methods
of food distribution in the United States. Prior to the development of the
refrigerator car there were no large fresh meat slaughterers. The high
perishability of fresh meat necessitated slaughtering at or near the point
of consumption. With the advent of the refrigerator car, however, animals
were slaughtered near the centers of production and by shipping only the
edible portions of the carcass, great savings in freight were obtained.
Due to the large volume and centralization of the big packers, it became
possible effectively to process the waste portions into salable by-products
which is to a great extent impossible for the local slaughterer as his vol-
ume is insufficient to support the cost of the by-product processing plant.
These two factors have encouraged the growth of the large packer and
have caused the industry to become almost exclusively located at the large
stockyards which in turn are located advantageously near the livestock
producing centers.
court order they had assigned all the voting stock in these companies to trustees
appointed by the court, these trustees voting the stock. The trustees, however,
left the management of the various stockyards to the management already in
control as after a brief investigation they could find no unfair practices.
27. By various stays of execution of the decree, principally the order pro-
cured by the California Canneries suspending the decree, Swift and Armour
were still engaged in the unrelated lines at the time of the last decision of
the Supreme Court.
28. This makes it unnecessary to discuss that aspect of the business, except
to note that when the PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS AcT, 42 STAT. 159 (1921), 15
U. S. C. § 181 (1926), placing the stockyards under public control and trans-
ferring to the Secretary of Agriculture jurisdiction over packers in respect of
acts and practices violative of the anti-trust laws and competitive methods
(the Federal Trade Commission would otherwise have jurisdiction of some of
these matters), the prohibitions and regulations of the act were not made
more stringent due to the prohibitions of the consent decree. Record p. 1056.
It seems clear, however, that if the stockyards were carelessly supervised, control
of the yards by the larger packers would be detrimental to the public interest.
That the producers feel that the livestock industry is receiving little protection
under the Packers and Stockyards Act, see 14 The Producer No. 2, p. 14 (1932).
29. U. S. v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106 (May 1932).
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Prior to 1920 the distribution of groceries to the public was almost
exclusively handled by wholesalers purchasing from or acting as agents
for manufacturers and producers, and distributing to independent retailers.
Since then the importance of the wholesaler has been diminishing due to
two factors: (1) the growth of the chain store, both regular and volun-
tary 3 0 (co-operative) and (2) the integration of food manufacturers who
themselves perform the distributive function of the wholesaler.
The stipulations of the record in this case state that in 1920 there were
in the United States approximately 15,000 regular chain grocery stores, and
of that number approximately 1,200 had meat departments, while by 1929
this number had grown to 60,000 stores of which about 15,800 contained
fresh meat departments. 31 The total annual sales of centrally owned grocery
chain stores increased from $770,000,000 in 1920 to $3,500,000,000 in 1929.,12
The larger of these firms do a considerable share of the processing of meats
they sell; they buy carcasses from the packers and then do their own cur-
ing, bacon slicing and sausage making. This is alleged by the packers to
be the most profitable part of the packing operation. Testimony shows
that there is about 35% of the retail grocery business in the hands of the
centrally owned chains.38 The voluntary chains are calculated to comprise
almost 60,000 retail outlets, and, on the basis of a sample consisting of
36% of all voluntary chains, the number of units in 1929 is over four times
that in 1920. Today approximately 60% of the total grocery business is
concentrated in the hands of the regular and voluntary chains.84
30. A regular chain is one in which there is one ownership and management
of a chain of stores such as the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. The voluntary
chain is a group of independently owned retailers who co-operate in joint buying,
joint advertising, or in joint or group control of the operations of their retail
stores. There are three groups or classifications of voluntary chains. The
most important group is that which is sponsored by the wholesale grocers who
obtain concentration of purchases from a group of retailers in return for
merchandising and managing assistance which enables the retailers to operate
their stores more efficiently. The second group, commonly called a retailer-
owned wholesaler, is a regular wholesale grocery company having capital stock
owned entirely or largely by retail grocers. The third consists of organizations
in which a number of retail grocers combine for the purposes of group buying
or group advertising but without ownership of wholesale grocery facilities.
31. Stipulations of parties, Record p. 567.
32. Ibid. Total grocery sales increased during this period but the largest
part of the increase in grocery chain store sales came from business which was
formerly handled by the independent grocers.
33. Record p. 519, Testimony of Victor H. Pelz, Director of Research Staff,
American Institute of Food Distribution. The data of the Census of Distri-
bution to be published in December, 1932, show that for the year 1929 the
number of retail chain grocery units was 52,618 of which 17,249 contained
fresh meat departments. Total sales of regular grocery chain stores were
$2,833,980,000 which comprised 38.5o of total grocery sales.
34. Supra note 33. The witness admitted that this was only an estimate
and based on a rather shaky foundation, but it is apparently the best obtainable
figure. It seems reasonable as there are 120,000 chain stores out of a total of
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The other important recent development in food distribution is the
integration of manufacturers into large units and the formation of co-
operative marketing associations by producers. Many formerly independent
companies selling one or two branded commodities have merged into large
corporations controlling several of these formerly independent manufac-
turers.3 5
The packers claim that these two developments have altered the system
of food distribution so that they are in a greatly inferior position to that
occupied by them in 1920. They say that chain stores are in a position
to dictate prices to and to force large quantity discounts from the packers,
and that, by their buying meat in carload lots from central packing points,
the packers' branch house business is injured. These arguments, however,
lose sight of the fact that the chains compete vigorously as buyers in the
wholesale market, just as they compete as sellers in the retail market.
The complaint of loss of the branch house business is of small importance.
The packers are still selling their meat but the chains are buying directly
in large quantities. It is probably true, however, through the changes
in methods of food distribution, i.e., the growth of the large retailer who
is his own wholesaler, that the packers are losing that portion of their
profit which would have been allocated to the operation of the branch
houses.
The packers further contend that the public interest would be amply
protected upon their entrance in the grocery lines by the competition which
would be offered by the large food manufacturing companies. However, the
competition of those amalgamated concerns which handle groceries would not
be very extensive as their total volume of business is comparatively small O
and the branded articles in which they deal do not constitute a very large
share of the average grocery store volume. In urging that they be al-
lowed to take on the prohibited lines, the packers point to the fact that
these combinations represent a defense of small manufacturers against
the pressure of chain store buying policies. But this integration of con-
cerns in allied lines into "conglomerations," which was prevalent prior
to 1929, was made with the view of securing more efficient distribution.37
The chief advantage the packers enjoy in distribution is through their
ownership of almost all of the refrigerator cars suitable for transporting
about 300,000 grocery stores and the business of a chain store unit is kmown to
be Mch greater than that of the average independent.
35. General Foods Corporation, which grew out of the Postum Co., now
manufactures and sells through its subsidiaries a great variety of branded
articles. Standard Brands Inc. and Gold Dust Corporation are similar con-
cerns. Large chains of dairies and ice-cream plants, such as National Dairy
Products Corporation and the Borden Co., have sprung up, and in most of
the larger cities they now practically control the milk and ice-cream business.
36. The sales of the four big food companies (National Biscuit Co., Standard
Brands, Inc., General Foods Corp., Gold Dust Corp.) amount to but a fraction
of the sales of either Swift or Armour.
37. Standard Brands' use of the Fleischmann delivery system for the dis-
tribution of its other lines is the best example.
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meats.38 A large part of these cars are used to ship carload lots to the
branch houses, the remainder being used on "peddler" 3 9 car routes. By
the tariff regulations of the railroads the freight charged on one of these
cars is on a certain minimum weight, generally 100,000 pounds for the
whole distance run by the car. Due to the necessity of maintaining a
regular schedule it is very frequently necessary to send out a car with
less than the minimum load for which freight is charged. If the packers
were allowed to deal in groceries they could fill up the car with additional
goods. For the amount added up to the minimum, under the mixing rules
of the Interstate Commerce Commission,40 there would be no additional
charge. While the packers technically would pay freight for shipping the
groceries they would pay practically the same amount for freight as if
they had shipped only meats.41 To this extent they would have an enor-
mous advantage over the wholesale grocer who must pay freight on each
item shipped. The refrigerator cars of the packers, due to the perishable
nature of their contents, receive preferential handling from the railroads.
By shipping groceries in these cars they would be able to make deliveries
much more rapidly than the independent wholesaler who ships by regular
freight service. This quick delivery of the packers' shipping system would
give them a considerable trading advantage due to the increasing tendency
of retailers to buy from hand to mouth.
The packers also would be able to utilize their branch houses as ware-
houses for groceries and the same salesmen could take orders for both
meats and groceries. The packers are thus in a position to distribute
"substitute" foods (e. g., eggs, fish and other substitutes for meats)
and other unrelated commodities with slight increase in overhead, the
practical effect of which would be to make the packers' profit on the gro-
cery line closely approach the gross margin of selling price above cost.
42
38. A distinction should be made between a meat car and one for vegetables
or fruits. Meats are required to be kept at a temperature of 30-32' F. while
vegetables and fruits take a temperature of about 400 F. It is possible to obtain
the latter temperature with the ordinary ventilator refrigerator car which has
bins in each end which are filled with ice. The meat car on the other hand is
air-tight and to produce a sufficiently low temperature ice and salt are placed
in brine tanks. The cars must be made with a stronger roof as the carcasses
are suspended from the roof of the car. The big packers own about 90% of
the meat cars, the rest being owned by the independents and a few by common
carrier car lines.
39. A peddler or route car is a refrigerator car which is sent out from it
packing plant or a branch house, operating on a regular schedule and serving
towns too small to support a branch house.
40. See National Wholesale Grocers Association v. Director General, 62
I. C. C. 375 (1921).
41. The statement that the "meat carries the load," i.c., the freight, is
obviously inexact. But the packer can make a profit on his meat by shipping
it alone, so when he adds groceries to his car and is forced to pay no more his
position as regards competition with the grocer is the same as if he paid no
freight.
42. Subject of course to a qualification similar to that in note 41-that no
apportionment of the existing overhead be made.
[Vol. 42
It would thus seem that the price to the public of all food would tend to
be reduced.
The opinion of the Court summarily disposed of the packers' contention
that they should be allowed to recoup the alleged profits lost by the chain
store buying policies by entering the wholesale grocery business and that
such entrance is in the public interest. Mr. Justice Cardozo pointed out
that, although the packers' capacity to make such distribution cheaply by
reason of their existing facilities was one of the principal reasons why
the decree was modified in the lower court, it was one of the chief reasons
for excluding the packers from the unrelated lines in the original decree.
He also emphasized the fact that the packers had been guilty of numerous
aggressions throughout their history, and that the fear of a recurrence
of such aggressions, which had been a moving cause for the injunction
of 1920, had not been removed. Furthermore, the danger that the packers,
if permitted to deal in groceries, would drive their rivals to the wall, still
existed. The Court, showing a fear of "full line forcing" by the packers,
dismissed the rise of the chain stores with the declaration that the chains
now look to the packers for their meats 43 and, with the modified decree,
would naturally look to them for other things as well. The order modi-
fying the decree on the ground that conditions had not changed sufficiently
to make the restraints unduly oppressive was therefore reversed. 44 The
Ifiial decree on the mandate was issued in the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia on June 15, 1932, giving the packers one year from the date
to dispose of their stocks on hand. It is believed that this is the last word
in the case, the decree having been sustained upon every ground.
As the report of the Federal Trade Commission led to the suit, it is
interesting to consider its position when asked to report on the proposed
vacation of the decree in 1924.45 After its original investigation, the
Commission had recommended to the President that the packers be required
to give up their control over the stockyards and the refrigerator car lines
and that the Government take over control of such of the branch houses,
cold storage plants and warehouses of the packers as were necessary to
provide facilities for the competitive marketing and storage of food
products in the principal centers of distribution and consumption. 0 The
43. Sales of the big four in 1929 were $2,500,000,000; those of their thirteen
principal competitors were $407,000,000.
44. Brandeis, McReynolds, and Roberts, JJ., concurred; Butler and Van
Devanter, JJ., dissented, finding that conditions had changed sufficiently to
make continued enforcement of the decree inequitable to the packers; the Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Sutherland and Mr. Justice Stone took no part in the
consideration of this case. The Chief Justice had appeared as counsel for the
packers in this suit, Mr. Justice Stone had been Attorney General while the
suit was pending, and Mr. Justice Sutherland had been a trustee of the court
holding the stock of the packers in the stockyards companies until the packers
could dispose of it.
45. F. T. C. REPORT ON PACKER CONSENT DECREE, SEN. DOC. No. 219, 68th
Cong. 2d. Sess. (1925).
46. Supjra note 11, Part I, at 26.
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Commission's report on the consent decree stated that the Commission had
not been consulted as to its terms and found fault with it on the ground
that the packers had been allowed to retain their refrigerator car lines.
The Commission attached little importance to the whole question of packer
manufacture or sale of the unrelated lines once the big packers were di-
vorced from their control of refrigerator cars. 47 "In so far as this (packers'
refrigerator car) system offers economies and better services it should be
preserved, if practicable. But if it involves a menace to competition in
the sale of grocery products, or an unfair advantage to one group of
competitors it should be regulated to avoid those evils. Through divorce-
ment of the packers from their control of refrigerator cars, thus rendering
their car service available on equal terms to all distributors of meats and
groceries, the Commission believes that the alleged economic advantages
of the system to the public may be preserved and the competitive disad-
vantages to other distributors eliminated."48
It seems that the idea of eliminating the packers from the unrelated
lines originated with Mr. Hoover when, as Food Administrator, he was
asked to submit his conclusions on the recommendations of the Federal
Trade Commission.49 Mr. Hoover agreed with all the recommendations
of the Trade Commission except as to public control of the branch houses,
etc.,50 and brought up the question, which had not been discussed in the
Commission's recommendations,51 of the whole phase of absorption of
other food industries. He found it "at least worth thought" whether the
packer aggregations should not be confined to more narrow and limited
activities such as those involved in the slaughter of animals, the prepara-
tion and marketing of the products therefrom alone.
The economic considerations pertinent to a decision upon modification of
the consent decree may be summarized as follows:
(1) Whether the packers, if left unrestricted and allowed to expand
into every line of food distribution until they become a major influence
4'7. The position of the Commission would not provide a cure of the alleged
evils existing as a result of the big packers' advantages in transportation. It
would offer refrigerator car service to all shippers on an equal basis but the
advantage of speedy shipment would still obtain in the competition between the
packers and the grocery wholesalers as refrigerator cars are a specially expedited
form of traffic.
48. Supra note 11, Part I, at 31-32. In the next paragraph it is stated, quali-
fying the above, that the Commission prefers not to express an opinion on the
economic wisdom of permitting the big packers to resume the distribution of
groceries or other unrelated lines without a comprehensive study, an important
part of which would be an inquiry into the extent to which competition has
been restored in the meat packing industry.
49. Letter of Mr. Herbert Hoover, Food Administrator, to the President,
Sept. 11, 1918.
50. He disagreed with this recommendation on the ground of its practica-
bility only.
51. The distinction should be made between the recommendations of the
Trade Commission made in a letter to the President on July 3, 1918 and the
report which was issued at intervals' from November 1918 to June 1919.
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in each line, will still be able to offer cheaper distribution and handling.
Mr. Hoover said: "It is certain to my mind, that these businesses have
been economically efficient in their period of competitive upgrowth, but
as time goes on, this efficiency cannot fail to diminish and, like all monop-
olies, begin to defend itself by repression rather than by efficiency." That
the packers perhaps have reached this point of diminishing returns might
be indicated by their earnings as compared with those of the independent
packers. 52
(2) Whether it follows that the claimed economies of large scale
packer distribution of groceries will be passed on to the consumer, es-
pecially in view of the previous commercial practices of the packers.
(3) Whether, even if these economies are effected and part of the
saving is passed on to the consumer, other social considerations such as
(a) preservation of the competitive system and (b) prevention of con-
centration of control of the food industry in a few hands,5 3 are sufficient
to warrant continuance of the restrictions.
In spite of the fact that some of the justices of the Supreme Court are
reputed to be quite skeptical of the competitive system, the opinion of the
Court seems to be mainly based on the ground that modification would tend
to destroy that system insofar as the food industry is concerned. Once
52. Supra note 49. The percentage earnings on net worth of all meat
packing companies reporting to the Packers and Stockyards Administration
in 1929 was 6.45%, that of the big packers was 4.55%, defendants' brief pp.
52-53, Record pp. 817, 888a. On the other hand the lower earnings of the big
packers might be ascribed to the fact that they are engaged in many lines of
activity in which profits are always low and that this brings down their average
profit percentage on all their business.* No figures are available to compare
earnings solely from the meat packing industry of the big packers and those
of the independents.
53. It is apparent that such a large unit would in innumerable ways be
able to dictate to trade generally and to secure great advantages to the general
detriment and suffocation of competition. Timely examples are the various
"tonnage reciprocity" arrangements which would force the railroads into mak-
ing what is in fact a renewal of the rebate system. Swift and Armour have
both been able to engage in this practice. The Mechanical Manufacturing
Co. owned by members of the Swift family and officers of Swift & Co. mall'u-
factures bumping posts, draft gears and other railway equipment. The Waugh
Equipment Co. similarly owned by the Armour people produces draft gears,
centering devices and other railway appliances. Suggestions were made to
the traffic department of a railroad that the Swift or Armour people respectively
would be very pleased if that railroad would be able to utilize any of the products
of that company. Obviously, the railroad which buys the equipment obtains
the traffic of the packers which is largely competitive as to routings. Cease
and desists orders were issued against both concerns by the Federal Trade
Commission. In the Matter of Waugh Equipment Co., 15 F. T. C. 232 (1931);
In the Matter of Mechanical Manufacturing Co., F. T. C. Doe. 1727, decided
March 4, 1932. The Interstate Commerce Commission has conducted an ex-




convinced that such a large share of the industry should not be controlled
by one or two interests, the court was compelled to refuse modification
since otherwise it would be impossible ever again to enjoin the packers
from lawfully engaging in the now prohibited unrelated lines.
STATE TAXATION OF ELECTRIC POWER
A SUGGESTED MODIFICATION OF COE V. ERROL
IT is generally conceded that the true function of constitutional doctrines
is to serve as a means of rationalizing decisions for purposes of clarity and
predictability.1  Where, because of changing social conditions, individual
doctrines no longer serve their function, it is time that they should under-
go a process of restatement in harmony with the Supreme Court's prev-
alent notions of social policy.2 Several recent cases of taxation under
the commerce clause of the Constitution3 would seem to indicate that
at least one constitutional doctrine which has done yeoman's service for
close to half a century is ready, if not past due, for such a process of
change.
In the year 1885 the case of Coe v. Errol4 came before the Supreme
Court. New Hampshire logs had been hauled to the banks of the Andros-
coggin River and there piled awaiting spring freshets to carry them down-
stream to a point in the state of Maine. New Hampshire tax day arrived
while the logs were on the river bank. Balancing the social need for free
channels of commerce against New Hampshire's need for revenue, the
Court did not hesitate to sustain the property tax, announcing in its
opinion that goods do not begin to be governed and protected by the nation-
al law of commercial regulation until the moment "in which they commence
their final movement for transportation from the State of their origin to
that of their destination," 5 and that the hauling to the river banks was
merely preliminary to such final movement. Thus arose the doctrine that
goods enter interstate commerce at the moment in which their final move-
ment to an extra-state destination commences.
Early in the career of Coe v. 'Errol the Court had occasion to enunciate
a supplementary doctrine. In Kidd v. Pearson,0 a case involving the validity
of an Iowa statute prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquor within
the state, the Court stated that as manufacture is not a part of interstate
commerce, prohibition of manufacture is not a burden thereon. Seven
1. Albertsworth, The Rise and Fall of Constitutional Doctrine (1931) 17
A. B. A. J. 471, 472.
2. Id. at 471 et seq.
3. U. S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 3.
4. 116 U. S. 517 (1886).
5. Id. at 525.
6. 128 U. S. 1 (1888).
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years later, in United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,7 a case involving the
federal anti-trust laws, the principle of Kidd v. Pearson was expressed in
the oft-quoted statement that "commerce succeeds to manufacture and is
not a part of it." Though this doctrine has been questioned, in taxation
cases at least, it has lived a hardy life. So long as processes of manu-
facture and production continued to be such that they were entirely com-
pleted before the final movement of commodities to their destination had
commenced, there was nor doubt that the doctrines of Coc v. Errol and
Kidd v. Pearson were in absolute harmony with one another. As processes
of manufacture and distribution became integrated, however, it became in-
creasingly difficult to maintain this harmony. Recent litigation would
seem to indicate that it is now impossible so to do.
In Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord,8 decided in 1923, the subject or
attack was a Minnesota occupation tax on all ore mined within the state.
In the case of several of the appellants, the act of mining consisted in
steam shovels severing the ore from its natural bed and dumping it into
cars which were immediately hauled away and formed into trains which.
started the ore on its interstate journey. From the instant of severance
there was a continuity of movement, on which waspredicated the claim of
the appellants that the tax constituted an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce. The Court found, however, that the act of severing
the ore was an act of production preceding final movement, and as such
subject to state taxation.
Assuming that the doctrines of Coo v. Errol and Kidd v. Pearson have
actual worth as instruments of forecast, there would have been no great
difficulty in predicting the outcome in Oliver Iron Mining Co. V. Lord.
However, prediction of the next important case to come before the Court
would have proven more difficult. In Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall,9 the
state of West Virginia had imposed an occupation tax measured by the
gross proceeds from the sale of natural gas produced within the state.
The appellant conceded that under the rule of the preceding case a tax
on the gas at the well would be valid, but assailed the tax as to gas pumped
outside the state in continuous movement from the wells as being imposed
upon the gross proceeds of sales in interstate commerce.' o The Supreme
Court held, however, that the tax, as construed by the state court to be
upon the value of the gas at the wells before interstate commerce had
commenced, was valid. It is difficult to see how the statute could be so
construed. The sole act of production in the case of natural gas is the
act of pumping, or, if under natural pressure, the opening of valves. This
act is the production of the final, continuous movement of the gas in its
interstate journey." Until this movement is started there is no act of
7. 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
8. 262 U. S. 172 (1923).
9. 274 U. S. 284 (1927).
10. Under the rule of Philadelphia & S. Mail S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122
U. S. 326 (1887), and cases following it.
11. Of course, the Court might have done lip service to the doctrine of Coo
v. Errol by fixing some arbitrary point in the continuous flow of gas, e. g., at
the pumps, and saying that up to that point the flow was "merely preliminary."
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production subject to taxation. The tax was an occupation tax rather than
a property tax, and could not be assessed before the act of production had
occurred. That act was, under any reasonable application of Coe v. Errol,
an act of interstate commerce, and immune from state taxation. But the
decision was otherwise.
The doctrine of Coe v. Errol was even more inadequate for the purpose
of predicting the result reached, in the recently decided case of Utah Power
and Light Co. v. Pfost.12 The state of Idaho had imposed an excise tax
of one half mill per kilowatt hour on all electric energy generated within
the state "either through water power or by any other means" for barter,
sale, or exchange. The appellant was engaged in the generation of electric
energy by the use of water power. Approximately 85% of the energy so
generated was transmitted to and sold in Utah and Wyoming.1 0 The
appellant's major contention was that as to this portion of the energy
generated, the appellant was engaged in interstate commerce, and was
thereby exempt from state taxation.
Despite the general consensus of scientific opinion to the contrary, 14 the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, declared that "it is wholly
inaccurate to say that appellant's entire system is purely a transferring
device," and stated that "on the contrary, the generator and the transmis-
sion lines perform different functions, with a result comparable, so far
as the question here under consideration is concerned, to the manufacture
of physical articles of trade and their subsequent shipment and transporta-
tion in commerce." 15 If the scientific view that an entire electric system
is nothing more than a device for the transfer of energy 16 be accepted for
legal purposes, a generator in an interstate power system is nothing more
than an intermediate carrier of the intangible commodity energy. As the
final continuous movement of energy commences, in the case of a hydro-
electric system, at the instant when the water begins to flow through the
flume at the dam, and is not interrupted until the point of utilization is
12. 286 U. S. 165 (1932). The earlier stages of the case are reported in
54 F. (2d) 803 (D. Idaho 1931), and 52 F. (2d) 226 (D. Idaho 1931).
13. This percentage is not given in the opinion of the Supreme Court, but
can be derived from figures reported in 54 F. (2d) 803, 804 (D. Idaho 1931).
14. See, for example, the affidavit of Dr. Robert A. Millikan, reported in the
related case of South Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission,
52 F. (2d) 515, 523 (E. D. S. C. 1931). Dr. Millikan gave similar testimony
in the Utah Power Co. case (Record, pp. 109-122), as did Dr. Irving Langmuir,
Assistant Director of General Electric Company's research laboratory (Record,
pp. 122-142).
15. Utah Power and Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 105, 180-181 (1932).
16. The so-called "forms of energy," such as electric energy, mechanical
energy, etc., get their names from the various carriers of energy. Energy itself
is intangible and incapable of form. Because of its incapability to take form,
and of its constant nature regardless of the change in carriers, it is not sur-
prising that the Court was unwilling to accept energy apart from some par-
ticular carrier as a new commodity of commerce.
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reached,' 7 under the doctrine of Coe v. Errol the act of generation, being
but an act of transmission subsequent to the commencement of this final
movement, would clearly be an act of interstate commerce.
Even though we accept as justified the Court's refusal to recognize
energy apart from form as a commodity of interstate commerce and con-
sider that the generator, in changing the form of energy from mechanical
to electrical, engages in an act comparable to manufacture or production,
the doctrine of Coe v. Errol if applied would lead to a decision contrary to
that reached by the Court. The transformation of energy to electric form,
which constitutes the sole act of production, consists of the production of
a current or flow of electrons under pressure.' 8 Without electric pressure
there can be no electric current, and without the simultaneous occurrence
of electric pressure and electric current, there can be no production of
electric energy.'9 Hence it may be said that electric energy is created2
simultaneously with electric current. But from the very moment that
electric current is created, electric energy is transmitted at the phenomenal
rate of 186,000 miles per second.2 ' Thus electric energy is created, or
rather, energy is transformed to the electric form, while enroute to its
final destination at that rate of speed.2 2 Therefore, despite Mr. Justice
Sutherland's ipse dixit statement that "while conversion and transmission
are substantially instantaneous, they are, we are convinced, essentially
separable and distinct operations,"2 3 it is impossible to assess the Idaho tax
before the final interstate movement of electric energy commences.2
17. See the evidence cited supra note 14. The lower court included this
statement in its findings of fact (Record, p. 90).
18. See the evidence cited supra note 14; also 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITAxNICA
(14th ed. 1929) 174 et seq.
19. Ibid.
20. It is fundamental that energy itself cannot be created or destroyed. By
the creation of a particular form of energy is meant its transformation from
a like amount of energy in some other form.
21. See the evidence cited supra note 14.
22. The very fact that it is physically impossible to store electric current
or energy in an alternating current system such as all interstate power com-
panies employ (see the evidence cited supra note 14) necessitates that the
transmission be continuous. An electric transmission system does not even have
storage capacity such as that in a natural gas pipe line, since a flow of electrons,
unlike a flow of gas, is practically incompressible.
23. Utah Power and Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 179 (1932).
24. In the related case of South Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax
Commission, 52 F (2d) 515, 524 (E. D. S. C. 1931), aff'd, 286 U. S. 525 (1932),
the District Court, somewhat in the manner suggested supra note 11, stated
that the interstate movement of electric energy did not commence until after
the energy had passed through the step-up transformers prior to long distance
transmission. Inasmuch as the quantity of electric energy would be substantially
the same and since there would be no interruption whatsoever in its 186,000
miles per second transmission up to, through and beyond the transformers, even
though the characteristics of the carrier (viz. current and pressure of the flow
of electrons) would be changed, it is rather difficult to consider the energy leav-
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The conclusion to be drawn from the decision of the Court in the Utah
Power Company case as interpreted in the light of the facts as they are,
rather than as Mr. Justice Sutherland concluded them to be, is that a
commodity does not always enter interstate commerce at the moment in
which its final continuous movement to an extra-state destination com-
mences. Instead, a commodity does not enter interstate commerce, regard-
less of when such final movement commences, until manufacture or pro-
duction has been completed. It would seem then that in order to avert a
recurrence of litigation such as has taken place in the three recent cases
discussed,25 the Supreme Court should discontinue its efforts to separate
production and distribution into severable and distinct transactions regard-
less of the physical facts involved, and enunciate instead the doctrine that
irrespective of when distribution is begun, production or manufacture for
extra-state distribution is not an act of interstate commerce. In other
words, wherever on the physical facts of a case Coe v. Errol and Kidd 'v.
Pearson are in conflict, the doctrine of Kidd v. Pearson is to control.
Any effort to modify constitutional doctrine to conform to current de-
cisions necessarily focuses attention on the question of the value of the
proposed modification. Assuming that prior to the case of Oliver Iron
Mining Co. v. Lord, the first of our three recent cases in point of time,
the Supreme Court had enunciated the doctrine suggested above, to the
effect that in any case of conflict between the principles of Coe V. Errol
and Kidd v. Pearson the doctrine of the latter case should reign supreme,
would the expensive litigation in those cases have been avoided?
It seems evident from'a consideration of the decisions themselves, though
not from the opinions, 26 that the motivating cause behind each decision
was the Court's contemporary notions of social policy. Undoubtedly the
pressing need of the states for additional sources of revenue to meet mount-
ing costs of government was a powerful factor behind each decision.2 7
In the first two cases, exhaustion of the state's natural resources was
another consideration in the state's favor; but in the last case, since the
tax was not restricted to hydro-electric plants, the exploitation of natural
ing the transformer as a new commodity or the transmission up to the point
of leaving the transformer as "merely preliminary." It is interesting to note
that though the lower court in Utah. Power and Light Co, v. Pfost, 54 F (2d)
803, 805, 806 (D. Idaho 1931), placed some reliance on the holding of the District
Court in the South Carolina case, the Supreme Court did not resort to that
argument.
25. See notes 8, 9 and 12, supra.
26. Opinions such as those in these three cases have given rise to the state-
ment that "what is being taxed seems sometimes to be determined by norms
of nomenclature rather than economic effect;" Powell, State Production Taxes
and the Commerce Clause (1923) 12 CALIF. L. Rnv. 17.
27. That past decisions have seriously handicapped the states, see Alberts-
worth, Congressional Assent to State Taxation Otherwaiso Unconstitutional
(1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 821.
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resources was not, on the record at least,28 an element. On the other hand,
in each of the three cases the business of the appellant clearly transcended
state lines. Furthermore, in each case the state appeared to be taking
advantage of the unequal distribution of natural resources to exact a toll
on commodities flowing out of the state.2 9 In view of the fact that the
Supreme Court has recently declared that under certain circumstances a
state may not directly30 or indirectly 31 forbid the exportation of its natural
resources or require their reduction to the finished product within the
state, 32 this aspect of a toll on exports would seem to weigh somewhat
against the states. Perhaps in the Natural Gas case, certainly in the Utak
Power Company case, a factor for consideration was the possible advantage
of reserving generation, or production of interstate power, or gas, for
federal or regional regulation as a single unit along with transmission and
sale to distributing companies, which the states have already been denied
the power to regulate.33 Against this, however, would weigh the necessity of
letting the utilities proceed unregulated and untaxed until such regional
or federal boards should be established, and also the possibility of recog-
nizing power in the states only until such boards should be established.
28. Though the fact was not brought out in the record, practically all power
developed within the state is developed from water power. The 1926 figures for
electric power production within the state by public-utilities showed 808,522,000
kilowatt-hours from water power and 2,267,000 kilowatt-hours from other
sources; U. S. Geological Survey, Water Supply Paper No. 579 (1928) pp.
164-166.
29. In the Oliver Iron Mining Company case, practically all of the ore was
destined for points outside the state. In the Hope Natural Gas Company case,
figures given in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 589 (1923) would
seem to indicate that nearly 60% of the gas produced within the state is shipped
outside the state. In the Utah Power Company case, assuming total produc-
tion by utilities within the state in 1930 equal to the 1926 figures of 810,789,000
kilowatt-hours, supra note 28, in 1930 the appellant alone transmitted 198,502,000
kilowatt-hours, supra note 13, or more than 24% of the total for the entire
state for the year, to points outside the state. Figures for other companies are
not now available. Idaho has only 12% of the population of the eight Mountain
states; but 26c% of the potential water power available 505% of the time and 31%
of the installed water power; U. S. Geological Survey, op. cit. mupra note 28,
at 123-128.
30. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923).
31. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229 (1911).
32. Foster Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1 (1928).
33. Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298 (1924); Public
Utilities Commission v. Attleboro S. & E. Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927). See note
(1931) 41 YAIE L. J. 305. The problem as to when electric energy leaves
interstate commerce is quite as intricate as the problem as to when it enters
it. With Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro S. & E. Co., 273 U. S. 83
(1927), where a sale to a distributing company of electric energy transmitted
across a state line was held to be an act of interstate commerce, compare South
Carolina Power Company v. South Carolina Tax Commission, U. S. Daily, July
26, 1932, at 982, (E. D. S. C. 1932), where such a sale at high voltage was held
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With these and like considerations as the true circumstances controlling
decisions, it might be asked how the proposed modified doctrine would
offer any improvement over the rule of Coe v. Errol. Under either of these
doctrines, the sole test of constitutionality would be: when is the tax as-
sessed? But clearly it is hardly more important in deciding cases involving
state taxation to determine when the burden is imposed, than it is to deter-
mine whether the burden itself is slight or excessive; whether, as compared
to expected benefits to, or the needs of, the taxing state, it is unduly heavy;
and whether the prognosticable repercussions of a particular decision will
be desirable or undesirable. Notwithstanding all this, however, the pro-
posed doctrine would seem to have distinct merit.
Perhaps sufficient justification for the retention of technical doctrines
lies in the fact that thus far no workable doctrine bearing a logical rela-
tion to the more important considerations has been developed. Until the
stage is set for some such radical change as the exclusive allocation of all
businesses transcending state lines to the federal government, with a
single uniform system of taxation and apportionment34 of revenue to the
several states to meet their fiscal needs, it would seem that technical doc-
trines based upon physical distinctions are the best that can be devised.
But it is essential that such doctrines, in order to avert unnecessary and
illogical litigation based upon minor issues, must be so modified and mod-
ernized that the same results may be reached in the decision of cases by
a consideration of all the circumstances involved as by the application of
the pertinent technical doctrines to the physical facts of the cases.
It is in compensating for a change in the physical facts of production
and distribution, where there has seemingly been no change in the direc-
tion of the resultant of all material factors, that the merit of the proposed
modified doctrine lies. Had the rule been existent before our three recent
cases were litigated, it does not necessarily follow that there would have
been no litigation,35 but it does follow that the distinction from other
not to be an act of interstate commerce because made from the same distri-
buting line from which local retail sales were made after reduction of voltage.
34. That apportionment is suggested as a present need, see Albertsworth,
supra note 27.
35. State occupation taxes are frequently attacked on grounds other than
that of constituting a burden on interstate commerce. Furthermore, the claim
that an occupation tax is a burden on interstate commerce may be based on
the contention either that it is imposed upon an act or article of such com-
merce or that it is measured by value derived from such commerce. The latter
argument was advanced in the Hope Natural Gas Company case, supra note 0.
Had the state court not held that the tax was to be measured by the value at
the wells, the Supreme Court would have had to determine whether the sales
value and the value of the gas prior to the commencement of interstate com-
merce were the same, in which case measurement by sales in interstate com-
merce would be nothing more than a convenient mpthod of measuring the pro-
duction tax, under American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459
(1919). The fact that technical doctrines take into account only one factor
behind decisions necessitates not only that doctrines be constantly revised but
also that they be numerous and flexible.
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earlier cases in which production taxes had been upheld, could not have
been made on the basis of a change in the time of production rlative to
the time of commencement of final movement. In like manner, the same
issue could not arise as to subsequent taxation of production in highly
integrated modern industries. Thus there would be prevented the accen-
tuation of a minor issue which might occur so long as the doctrine of Coe
v. Errol remains unmodified. Furthermore, clarity of decisions would be
preserved by elimination of the necessity of distorting physical facts, as
in the Utah Power Company case, in order to explain desired results by the
application of outworn technical doctrine. Moreover, so long as there is
no change in direction of the resultant of all material factors influencing
the validity of state occupation taxes, some basis of predictability would be
afforded.
STATUTORY TREATMIENT OF ANCESTRAL ESTATE AND THE
HALF BLOOD IN INTESTATE SUCCESSION
THE modern tendency toward statutory simplification of the law of intestate
succession seems obviously desirable, and convenience of administration
is a particularly persuasive factor in dealing with a problem the solution
of which is not convincingly explicable in terms of justice to the parties
involved. While the statutory scheme of intestate succession should, of
course, provide for results that in general seem fair, it can hardly be
framed so as to meet the exigencies of particular situations without setting
up a machinery of unwarranted complexity. The owner's almost unlimited
power of escaping the effects of the scheme by inter vivos or testamentary
disposition must be relied upon as a means of adjustment to particular
circumstances. Some statutory preferences, such as that of lineal descend-
ants, probably meet with general approval in view of the usual social and
economic relationship between the preferred class and the intestate; and
any change in them might well be resisted. In other instances, however,
consideration of the equities of specific cases being precluded, it seems
impossible to predict with any accuracy which of various alternatives
will in the long run provide the most satisfactory distribution. This would
seem to be true of the related questions of ancestral estate and inheritance
by relatives of the half blood.
The "ancestral estate" doctrine originated in the common law rule of
descent that only those collaterals who were of the blood of the "first
purchaser" of the land could inherit; those not of his blood were entirely
excluded-the land would escheat rather than go to them. Thus, if a
father purchased land which thereafter passed by descent to his son, and
the son then died intestate without issue, only those collaterals who were
related by blood to the father could inherit the land from the son; collaterals
on his mother's side were excluded from inheriting it. Or, if his mother
were the purchaser, his father's relatives would be excluded (unless, of
course, they were related by blood to the mother in some other way and
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not merely by marriage). Or, if his father's mother were the purchaser
his father's father's brother would be excluded. If the intestate himself
were the purchaser, this rule would have no effect; only his blood relatives
would be heirs in any event at common law. In other words, the common
law of descent inquired into the source of the intestate's title in order to
return the land, in the event of failure of lineal descendants, to the rela-
tives of the person who first brought it into the family. No such doctrine
as this appears to have obtained in the distribution of intestate person-
alty in England. Blackstone attempted to trace the common law rule to
a purely feudal origin,1 but modern historians tend to discount the effect
of feudalism, and believe that the doctrine was probably more ancient and
widespread. 2 The conception that property should return to the side of
the family from which it came is reasonable enough. On the other hand,
complete abolition of the doctrine is not likely to meet with serious op-
position and has the definite administrative advantage of eliminating
from the intestate scheme a complex product of obscure antiquities.8
Under the common law of descent, kindred of the half blood (i.e., collateral
relatives of the intestate descended from different spouses of a common
ancestor) were absolutely excluded. The land would escheat if only rela-
tives of the half blood survived. In the case of personalty, however, the
Statute of Distributions of 1670 was construed to permit relatives of the
half blood to share equally with thos6 of the whoje blood of the same degree.
Blackstone explained the common law exclusion of the half blood as a rule
of evidence auxiliary to the requirement that the heir be of the blood of
the first purchaser. 4 But this seems an unconvincing basis for the doctrine,6
1. 2 BL. Co im. *220. His fundamental suggested reason for the origin of
the rule was apparently that aptitude for the performance of feudal services
would run in the blood. The "first purchaser" would be the original tenant
selected by the lord for the performance of these services, and only those of
his blood should be permitted to take his place in the feudal relationship.
2. 2 PoLLocK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898) 300;
2 HoLDswoRTH, HisroRy OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1927) 93; 3 id. 179. of.
MArrLAND, The Law of Real Property (1879), 1 CO.. PAP. (1911) 162, 175
(" 'Feudalism' is a good word, and will cover a multitude of ignorances.")
3. Simes, Ancestral and Non-ancestral Realty, (1928) 2 U. CINN. L. REv. 887.
For means of breaking descent, see (1912) 12 CoL. L. Rnv. 625.
4. 2 BL. CoMm. *228. The basis of this rationalization is that, since a
relative of the half blood would have fewer ancestors in common with the
intestate than a relative of the whole blood, the former would be less likely than
the latter to be of the blood of the first purchaser. Cf. 3 HOLDSWoTTH, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 183.
5. The argument that relatives of the half blood were entirely excluded in
all cases because of the possibility that in some cases they might not be of
the blood of the first purchaser is not persuasive. In many situations, a
relative of the half blood might be related to the first purchaser whereas a
relative of the whole blood would not. This was not a matter of a presump-
tion; the half blood would be excluded even if definitely proved to be of the
blood of the first purchaser. To explain an inflexible rule of total exclusion
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and surely would not justify its continuance today. The exclusion of the
half blood was only decided upon after a period of fluctuation and un-
certainty as to the proper disposition of the matter. There seems no
obvious solution of the problem. The common law rule, though arbitrary,
was clear and simple and increased the possibility of escheat; perhaps no
more complex explanation is justified.6 Total exclusion of the half-blood,
however, would seem unnecessarily severe today, though the diversity of
the American statutes indicates that there is little uniformity of opinion
as to their proper place in the intestate scheme. Attempts to argue either
this matter or that of ancestral estate in terms of the probable intention
of the deceased seem too speculative to be usefuliv
A majority of the United States no longer recognize the doctrine of
ancestral estate, but distribute realty and personalty without regard to the
source of the intestate's title.8 Those states still retaining a semblance
of the doctrine have modified the common law by statute.0 The ancestor
from whom descent must be traced is, with the exception of North Caro-
lina,' 0 the one from whom the property immediately came to the intestate,
rather than the first or original purchaser." The term "ancestor" is not
confined to a progenitor, but includes any blood relation.' 2 Whether, at
common law, "first purchaser" included other than lineal ascendants is
problematical. 13 Under modern statutes, a child may for this purpose be
the ancestor of its parent.' 4 In Indiana, a husband has been held to be
of intestate successors in terms of a rule of evidence would be unsatisfactory
in any event, and is particularly so here in view of its slight and fortuitous
probative value. Blackstone himself demonstrated the defective character of
this apologia, and suggested alteration of the rule.
6. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 305.
7. Ascertainment of the supposed intention of the transferor in the con-
struction of a written instrument of transfer is problematical enough. Yet
such a case at least concerns a particular individual, and the language of the
instrument and other admissible evidence furnish some data.
8. Six states exclude the whole blood as well as the half blood. Ann. STAT.
(Crawford & Moses, 1921) §§ 3480, 3482; IND. GEN. STAT. (Burns, 1926)
§§ 3329, 3330; N. J. CoMP. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1925) § 57 (5) (6); N. C. ANN.
CODE (1931) § 1654 (4) (6); R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 5551; TENN. CODE
(Shannon, 1932) § 8380. See note 23 for modification of North Carolina
Statute.
9. See supra, note 8 and statutes cited in notes following.
10. Poisson v. Pettaway, 159 N. C. 650, 75 S. E. 930 (1912).
11. Daly v. Connolly, 159 Atl. 314 (N. J. 1932) (mother); Lincoln v.
Herndon, 141 Okla. 212, 285 Pac. 120 (1930); Note (1916) L. R. A. 1916 C 902,
914 et seq.
12. Purcell v. Sewell, 134 So. 476 (Ala. 1931) (aunt); Bailey v. Bailey, 25
Milich. 185, 188 (1872); Brower v. Hunt, 18 Ohio St. 311, 338 (1868).
13. The common law authorities neglect to discuss this question. See 2
POLLOCK & MITA, supra, note 2, at 300; 2 BLAcKsToNE, CoMii. * 220; cf.
McCarthy v. Marsh, 5 N. Y. 265, 282 (1851).
14. Lavery v. Egan, 143 Mass. 389, 391, 9 N. E. 747, 749 (1887).
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the ancestor of his surviving spouse.15 Such results would be impossible
at common law because of the incapability of inheritance of a lineal ascend-
ant or surviving spouse. Another deviation from the common law lies
in the inclusion within the doctrine of realty coming to the intestate by
devise or gift as well as by descent.10 Rhode Island expressly limits the
application of its ancestral estate statute to realty only.'1 The majority of
states no longer differentiate between realty and personalty in the dis-
tribution of intestate property.' 8 In the absence of express limitation the
ancestral estate statutes might well be applied to both realty and personalty.
Several early cases, however, have confined the doctrine of ancestral estate
to realty, both because of the administrative difficulty of identifying the
source of changeable and transitory chattels and by reason of the historical
basis of the doctrine.19
Modern statutes governing ancestral estate merge that doctrine and
inheritance by the half blood. The modified expression of the doctrine
now usually operates only to exclude kindred of the half blood. The
treatment of the half blood in this country is very diverse. In thirteen
states distributing realty and personalty without regard to the source of
the intestate's title, kindred of the half blood take equally with those of
the whole blood of the same degree of consanguinity.20 Thirteen states2'
15. Cornett v. Hough, 136 Ind. 387, 35 N. E. 699 (1893); see (1927) 16
CALrF. L. REv. 162.
16. See statutes cited in notes following.
17. R. I. GN. LAws (1923) § 5554.
18. "The report of the committee disclosed that thirty-one (31) states had a
uniform descent and distribution table and that ten (10) additional states
had tables of descent and distribution which were uniform as to distributees
but different as to the shares of the surviving spouse." Since that date Now
York and Ohio have also abolished the distinction between realty and personalty.
16 A. B. A. J. 785 (1930). Delaware, New Jersey, North Carolina and Tenne-
see have separate tables. DEL. REv. CODE (1915) §§ 3267, 3382; N. J. COMP. STAT.
(Cum. Supp. 1925) §§ 57, 146-168; N. C. ANN. CODE (1931) §§ 137, 1654; TENN.
CODE (Shannon, 1932) §§ 8389, 8380.
19. Jenks v. Estate of Trowbridge, 48 Mich. 94 (1882); see Kelly's Heirs v.
McGuire, 15 Ark. 555, 594 (1855); Estate of Kirkendall, 43 Wis, 167, 175
(1877). Contra: Purcell v. Sewell, 134 So. 476 (Ala. 1931); Rountree v.
Pursel, 11 Ind. App. 522, 39 N. E. 747 (1894).
20. ILL. RaV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd 1931) c. 39 § 1; IowA CODE (1931) §§
11986-12040; K.AN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 22 § 128; ME. REV. STAT. (1930)
c. 89 §§ 1, 2, 20; MASS. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 190 §§ 1-4; N. H. PuB. LAws (1926)
c. 307 §§ 1-19; N. M. ANN. STAT. (1929) c. 38 §§ 101-120; N. Y. CoNs. LAWs (Ca-
hill, 1930) c. 13 §§ 81, 83; Onio ANN. GEN. CODE SuPP. (Page, 1932) §§ 10503-1,
10503-4; ORE. ANN. CODE (1930) c. 10 §§ 101, 102, 203; PA. ANN. STAT. (Purdon,
1930) c. 20 §§ 62, 75; VT. GEN. LAws (1917) §§ 3416, 3417; WASH. COMP. SrAT.
(Remington, 1922) §§ 1341, 1347, 1364.
21. ALA. ANN. CODE (1928) § 7369; CAL. PROB. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 254;
IDAHO CoIip. STAT. (1919) § 7796; MicH. Coip. LAwS (1929) § 13444; MINN.
STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8725; MONT. REV. CODES (Choate, 1921) § 7081; NED.
COMP. STAT. (1929) c. 30 § 111; NEv. Comp. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 9862;
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possess statutes approximating the Oklahoma statute which reads, "Kindred
of the half blood inherit equally with those of the whole blood of the same
degree unless the inheritance come to the intestate by descent, devise or
gift of some one of his ancestors, in which case all those who are not of
the blood of such ancestors must be excluded from such inheritance."=
Under this type of statute in default of kindred of the blood of the ancestor,
the half blood not of the blood of the ancestor have been permitted to take
equally with whole blood of the same degree.23 The decisions are in
conflict as to whether the intestate's kindred of the blood of such ancestor
take the inheritance in preference to closer kin of the half blood not of
the blood of the ancestor 2 4 Those cases which prefer the nearest of kin
to the intestate, applying the ancestral distinction only as against those
of the same degree seem more in harmony with the general purpose of the
intestate statutes to favor the nearest of kin to the intestate.
The remaining states do not consider the source of the intestate's title
in distributing his estate but discriminate against the half blood in various
ways. Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Missouri, Texas, Virginia,
West Virginia and Wyoming provide that within the same collateral degree
the kindred of the whole blood shall receive twice as much as those of the
half blood.25 In the event that all the heirs of the nearest class are of the
half blood, Arizona, Colorado, Texas and Wyoming grant them the portion
they would have received had they been of the whole blood. Florida,
Kentucky, Missouri, Virginia and West Virginia give the half blood whole
portions but double the allotment to ascendants. Connecticut and
Mississippi merely postpone the half blood to the whole blood in equal
N. D. Comp. LAws ANN. (1913) § 5752; OKLA. STAT. (1931) § 1626: S. D.
ComP. LAws (1929) § 710; UTAH Comp. LAws (1917) § 6420; Wms STAT. (1931)
c. 237 § 3. See supra, note 8 for the six states excluding whole blood as well
as half blood.
22. ORIA. STAT. (1931) § 1626.
23. Edwards' Estate, 259 Pac. 440 (1927). Cf. N. C. ANN. CODE (1931)
§ 1654 (5) expressly providing for inheritance by kindred not of the blood
of ancestor in default of kindred of his blood.
24. Belshaw's Estate, 190 Cal. 278, 212 Pac. 13 (1923) (half blood not of
blood of ancestor takes in preference to whole blood of blood of ancestor but
in remoter degree to decedent); Pond v. Irwin, 113 Ind. 243, 15 N. E. 272
(1888); ef. Ryan v. Andrews, 21 Mich. 229 (1870) (maternal grandmother
not of blood of ancestor takes in preference to kindred of half blood blood of
ancestor but of remoter degree). Contra: Kelly's Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark.
555 (1855); Thompson v. Smith, 102 Okla. 150, 227 Pac. 77 (1923); Perkins v.
Simonds, 28 Wis. 90 (1871); Rotenbach v. Young, 119 Misc. 2G7, 196 N. Y.
Supp. 220 (1922), af'd, 206 App. Div. 775, 200 N. Y. Supp. 946; 237 N. Y.
620, 143 N. E. 767 (1924). The Alabama statute is expressly limited to apply
only to those of the same degree. Cox v. Clark, 93 Ala. 400, 9 So. 457 (1890).
25. AIs. REV. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 981; CoLO. ANN. STAT.
(Courtright's Mills, 1930) § 7840; FLA. Cabi. LAws ANN. (1927) § 5486; Ky.
STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 1395; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 309; TEX. STALT. (1928)
§ 2573; VA. ANN. CODE (1930) § 5265; W. VA. OFF. CODS (1931) c. 42, art 1, § 2;
Wyo. REV. STAT. (1931) c. 88 § 4003.
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degree.26 In South Carolina, half brothers and sisters are postponed to
brothers and sisters of the whole blood, but kindred of the half blood in
more remote degrees of consanguinity are permitted to share equally with
others in their own degree.27 New Jersey and Delaware likewise prefer
brothers and sisters of the whole blood to brothers and sisters of the
half blood.28 In the absence of kindred of the whole blood, however, and
in the event that the estate is ancestral, only those half blood take who
are of the blood of the ancestor. Louisiana discriminates between brothers
and sisters of the whole and half blood in a different manner.20 The estate
is divided into paternal and maternal halves. Brothers and sisters of the
whole blood share in both halves while those of the half blood share in
their respective halves only. Georgia postpones the half blood on the
maternal side to the whole blood on the paternal side.30 Statutes in
Colorado and Wyomingprovide that "children and descendants of children
of the half blood" inherit equally with those of the whole blood.31 Since
a child cannot be of the half blood of either of its parent the term
"children" has been construed as "kindred."8 2
The tendency to abolish the doctrine of ancestral estate seems desirable,
and perhaps other jurisdictions may be expected to follow the recent ex-
amples of New York and Ohio in so doing. The prevailing type of statute
dealing with the doctrine is very obscurely phrased and fails to cover the
various problems; its amendment into more explicit and inclusive terms
would seem indicated in jurisdictions still wishing to retain the doctrine
in this form. If ancestral estate be eliminated, the problem of relatives
of the half blood is a comparatively simple one from the administrative
point of view, although, their precise ideal position in the intestate scheme
is not obvious.
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 4982; Miss. ANN. CODE (1930) § 1403; of.
MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 93, § 24.
27. S. C. CODE OF LAWS (1932) § 8906.
28. N. J. Coi'ip. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1925) § 57-5; Dmr.. Rnv. CODE (1915)
§ 3267. Delaware also prefers brothers and sisters of the whole blood to those
of the half blood as to realty and personalty.
29. LA. ANN. CIV. CODE (Dart, 1932) § 913. Thus if there are two brothers
of the whole blood and a brother of the half blood on the father's side, the
brothers of the whole blood would take five-sixths of the estate. Cf. King v.
Neely, 14 La. Ann. 160, 163 (1859).
30. GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 3931.
31. Supra, note 25.
32. Finley v. Abner, 129 Fed. 734 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904).
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THE RATE REGULATION OF FIRE INSURANCE COMPANMES
DURING the period when public attention was focused with emphatic dis-
approval on large industrial combinations, the business of fire insurance
had already attained sufficient size to merit consideration. The general
policy of fire insurance companies entering a certain territory was to
combine into an association for the purpose of establishing uniform rates,
and thereby to avoid the considerable expense necessitated by the creation
of a special rating bureau for each company. It was this membership
in rating bureaus, coupled with the resulting uniformity of rates, which
brought fire insurance companies within the provisions of the state anti-
trust laws.
In defeating criminal prosecutions for violation of state anti-trust
statutes,1 the fire insurance companies have been signally unsuccessful.2
Indictments, it is true, have been held insufficient, 3 but in one instance
at least, a sufficient indictment was later returned, and fines were imposed
on the companies totalling over $8,000,000.4 Nor have the companies been
better able to defeat petitions for a writ of ouster,3 or for the appoint-
ment of a receiver 6 sought by the state for anti-trust violations. Where
the companies have applied for an injunction to restrain enforcement of
an anti-trust statute, the constitutionality of the act has been directly
tested.7 But even here, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Holmes,
has upheld the constitutionality of such legislation on the ground that the
state may, without transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment, take such
steps as seem necessary for the preservation of competition.8 Again, on
1. Combinations of fire insurance companies to restrict competition were
not considered criminal at common law. People v. Aachen & Munich Fire
Insurance Co., 126 111. App. 636 (1906); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth,
106 Ky. 864, 51 S. W. 624 (1899); Harris v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 746, 73
S. E. 561 '(1912).
2. In re Pinkney, 47 Kan. 89, 27 Pac. 179 (1891) (habeas corpus proceed-
ings); State v. Phipps, 50 Kan. 609, 31 Pac. 1097 (1893). See State v. American
Surety Co., 91 Neb. 22, 135 N. W. 365 (1912).
3. Fire Insurance Companies v. State, 75 Mliss. 24, 22 So. 99 (1897).
4. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Robertson, 131 Miss. 343, 94 So. 7 (1922).
5. State v. Firemen's Fund Insurance Co., 152 Mo. 1, 52 S. W. 595 (1899).
6. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 387, 88 So. 883 (1921)
(suit at instance of revenue agent, who sought attachment of companies'
property). In Miller v. Fidelity Union Fire Insurance Co., 126 Mliss. 301, 88
So. 711 (1921), a bill to collect the statutory penalty for violation was dis-
missed because of insufficient averment of the unlawful agreement. See Mc-
Carter v. Firemen's Insurance Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 372, 73 Atl. 80 (1909) (injunc-
tion sought by attorney general).
7. Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Cornell, 110 Fed. 816 (C. C. D. Neb.
1901) (statute held unconstitutional).
8. Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U. S. 401 (1905). Another
method of control adopted was a penalty, paid to the insured, because of a
company's membership in a tariff association. ,The measure of the penalty was
generally 25% in excess of the stated loss. Continental Insurance Co. v. Parkes,
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the theory that the state has the power to prescribe terms for foreign
corporations doing business within the state, it has been held that a license
may be forfeited for an illegal combination to fix rates,9 even though the
combination was entered into outside the state and no attempt was made
to set the rates within the particular state.10
Although the enforcement of anti-trust legislation against fire insurance
companies has met with striking success,1 the policy has proven ill advised.
An uncontrolled rating bureau and a uniformity of rate structure may
well indicate the presence of an undesirable combination to restrict com-
petition. But it is clear that the maintenance of one organization, the
purpose of which is to fix rates within a state, is far more economical
than the forced establishment of a separate rating bureau for each com-
pany, which would not only result in considerable waste, but would en-
large the opportunities for inaccurate determination of risks. Then too,
it was soon realized that competition, with its concomitant rate wars, was
distinctly adverse to the public interest, which was as much concerned
with the securing of premiums adequate to maintain unimpaired reserves
as with protection from excessive rates. For these reasons, the states
have abandoned the policy of enforcing competition in fire insurance rates,
and have sought to establish some method of rate regulation. This hds
generally been accomplished by allowing the companies' rating bureau to
function under state supervision, or by empowering the state insurance
commission to establish its own rates.
Since 1914, when the constitutionality of fire insurance rate regulation
was definitely established, 12 little progress has been made toward the at-
tainment of effective regulation. Inasmuch as there has appeared a strong
tendency to proceed according to the established principles of public utility
regulation, an analysis of the problems which are presented, and the results
which have been reached, must necessarily be developed by analogy to the
142 Ala. 650, 39 So. 204 (1905). But the penalty has been as large as 25%
of the face value of the policy. Southern States Fire Insurance Co. v. Kron-
enberg, 199 Ala. 164, 74 So. 63 (191'7). This regulatory device was hold
constitutional in German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Hale, 219 U. S. 307 (1911).
9. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Raymond, 70 Mich. 485, 38 N. W. 474
(1888).
10. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. State, 76 ,Ark, 303, 89 S. W. 42 (1905),
overruling State v. Lancashire Insurance Co., 66 Ark. 466, 51 S. W. 633 (1899).
11. Only in suits by an individual, expelled from a tariff association because
of violations of its by-laws, have the companies been able to defend themselves
with general success. Continental Insurance Co. v. Board of Fire Underwriters,
67 Fed. 310 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1895); Beechley v. Mulville, 102 Iowa 602, 71
N. W. 428 (1897); People v. N. Y. Board of Fire Underwriters, 7 Hun 248
(N. Y. 1876). The apparent reason for this is the fact that the plaintiff has
not directly attacked the legality of the association, and therefore the courts
have not felt obligated to pass on the question. Louisville Board of Fire 'Under-
writers v. Johnson, 133 Ky. 797, 119 S. W. 153 (1909).
12. German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 (1914), affl'
German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 189 Fed. 769 (C. C. D. Han. 1911).
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familiar regulatory concepts of net income, the rate of return, and the
rate base.
The rough formula which has generally been adopted by courts and
commissions for the measurement of gross income from premiums charged
is that of "net premiums written" for the period under consideration.'5
By this is meant earned plus unearned permiums.14 The insurance com-
panies have strenuously urged that only earned premiums should be con-
sidered, on the ground that unearned premiums, required by law to be set
up in a reserve to meet losses and cancellations on unexpired policies, should
be treated as a liability rather than as income.1 The premiums charged
are designed to yield the company an amount sufficient to cover the basic
actuarial calculation as to losses and cancellations, expenses incident to
underwriting, and profit. These elements, however, appear not only in
the earned, but also in the unearned portion of the premiums collected.
Thus all of the unearned premiums should not be considered as a reserve
for losses and cancellations. The companies are apparently correct in
their contention that that portion of unearned premiums reserved for
losses and cancellations cannot be regarded as true income until the period
for which the risk was assumed has expired.10 This contention also seems
correct as applied to profit, which cannot be considered as earned until the
equivalent service of risk-bearing has been performed, or in other words,
until the premium has become earned. Only that element of unearned
premiums representing the allowance for expenses may properly be re-
13. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Travis, 121 Kan. 802, 257 Pac. 337 (1926);
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde, 315 Mo. 113, 285 S. W. 65 (1926), writ of
certiorari dismissed, 275 U. S. 440 (1928) (no federal question presented, in-
asmuch as the companies had sued jointly upon the ground that the aggregate
collections under the reduced rates ordered by the state of Missouri were con-
fiscatory, and yet had failed to show that the reduced rates were confiscatory
as to any one company. Mr. Justice Butler declared that "It has never been
and cannot reasonably be held that state-made rates violate the Fourteenth
Amendment merely because the aggregate collections are not sufficient to yield
a reasonable profit or just compensation to all companies that happen to be
engaged in the affected business"); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde 34 F. (2d) 185
(W. D. Mo. 1929) (separate actions filed subsequent to the Supreme Court
decision in 275 U. S. 440, and challenging the validity of the same Missouri
order for the reduction of rates); see Note (1930) 15 ST. LOuIS L. REV. 400, 407.
14. Earned premiums are that part of total premiums, all of which have
been paid in advance by the policyholders, chargeable to the elapsed portions of
the outstanding policies; unearned premiums are that part allocatable to the
unelapsed portions of such policies. For facilitating the calculation, at the end
of a business period, of the earned and 'unearned portions of policies exceeding
one year in duration, the Box Fraction Formula is employed, whereby all
policies are regarded as dating from the middle of the year in which they
were issued.
15. The companies have secured a favorable ruling on this in one instance.
Bullion v. Aetna Insurance Co., 151 Ark. 519, 237 S. W. 716 (1922).
16. 2 GEPHART, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE (1920) 215; HUEBNER, PnoPEnTy
INSURANCE. (1925) 217, 218.
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garded as income for the period under consideration, since the greater part
of the services covered by the charge for expenses are rendered within
six months from the date of issuance of the policies. Therefore, the in-
clusion of unearned premiums as part of the gross income seems to be
proper provided that there is deducted an amount equal to the reserve
which must be maintained against losses and cancellations on unexpired
policies, plus the estimated profit element in unearned premiums.11
There is the further problem of the inclusion of income from invest-
ments in the computation of gross income. Invested funds are composed
of contributions by the owners, or capital stock, and the reserves derived
from paid-in premiums. The tendency has been to include income from
invested reserves,18 However, in only two cases has the income from in-
vested capital contributions been considered,1 9 and in one of these instances
only indirectly, merely as a means of checking the reasonableness of the
rates previously ascertained. 20 The view that income from invested funds,
whether from contributed capital or reserves, should be excluded from
consideration, is based on the supposed distinction between the invest-
ment and the underwriting branches of the fire insurance business. This
distinction seems unsound in view of the facts that indemnification of the
public against loss is the sole function performed by the companies, and
that the entire invested capital is utilized in the performance of this func-
tion. Certainly, at least, the income from reserves created from contri-
butions by the policyholders themselves should be included in gross income.
In the calculation of deductions to be allowed from gross income, there
appear for consideration two elements of cost, losses and expenses. One
means f computing losses, advocated by the companies and adopted by at
least one court,21 is the incurred loss method, whereby there are added to
all losses paid during the particular period, unpaid losses outstanding at
17. The Virginia State Corporation Commission has ruled that unearned
premiums are to be included in gross income with a deduction allowed for
actual liability on unexpired policies. It thus holds that the allowances for
both the expense and profit elements are to be regarded as true income for
the period in which unearned premiums are received. Commonwealth v. Aetna
Insurance Co., VIRGINIA STATE CORPORATION COmmISSION (1929) 15.
18. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Travis, 124 Kan. 350, 259 Pac. 1068 (1927);
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde, 315 Mo. 113, 285 S. W. 65 (1926); Common-
wealth v. Aetna Insurance Co., supra note 17. Contra: Aetna Insurance Co.
v. Hyde, 34 F. (2d) 185 (W. D. Mo. 1929) (express holding); Bullion v. Aetna
Insurance Co., supra note 15 (omission of any consideration Qf this type of
income).
19. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Travis, supr note 18; Commonwealth v. Aetna
Insurance Co., supra note 17. In the other cases thus far litigated, income from
contributions of the owners has been expressly excluded in rate making calcu-
lations. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde, 34 F. (2d) 185 (W. D. Mo. 1929); Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Hyde, 315 Mo. 113, 285 S. W. 65 (1926); Bullion v. Aetna
Insurance Co., supra note 15.
20. Commonwealth v. Aetna Insurance Cu., supra note 17.
21. Bullion v. Aetna Insurance Co., supra note 15.
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the end of the period; from this are deducted unpaid losses outstanding at
the beginning of the period. The paid loss method, subscribed to by the
majority of the courts,22 takes into account solely the losses actually paid
out during the period. The "incurred" method, as employed by the com-
panies in their accounting, involves the use of estimates of outstanding
losses, which, however, are never corrected to accord with actual payments
made. Yet because of defective claims, settlements, etc., actual payments
made are generally less by some 10% than the estimated incurred losses.2
The "paid" method is erroneous in that it involves the assumption that
outstanding losses unpaid at the beginning are the same as those at the
end of the period; in a great number of instances, there results from this
assumption a substantial error in the computation of the total amount of
losses actually paid out for a given period.2 4 A more accurate means of
computing losses would seem to be the adoption of the "incurred" method,
and at the same time the correction of estimated incurred losses to con-
form to the actual payments later made.2 5 In the determination of ex-
penses, the attitude of the courts is substantially the same as for losses,
and like criticisms apply to the methods employed. There is one added
difficulty, however, in that underwriting expenses must be separated from
expenses of managing investments, if only the underwriting branch is to
be considered for rate making purposes. In this connection, the presence
of joint expenses necessitates some method of proration. The companies
have suggested that the mean invested assets be used as the basis; but
there still remains the problem of determining accurately what percentage
of this figure is to be utilized.
Just as the prevailing conception of the two distinct functions of under-
writing and banking has led in the majority of instances to the exclusion
of investment income from the determination of gross income, so has it
generally resulted in the adoption of net premiums written as a rate base.2
Obviously, the profitableness of a financial venture depends on the return
secured to the contributed capital. But it is not clear what relation net
premiums written would bear to invested capital. Therefore, it is by no
means certain that a return allowed with reference to such a rate base
22. See note 13, supra.
23. Approximately 10O is the usual figure given. See Aetna Insurance
Co. v. Travis, supra note 13, at 805, 257 Pac. at 342. The Virginia State
Corporation Commission, however, found a much greater disparity. Common-
wealth v. Aetna Insurance Co., supra note 17, at 78.
24. The courts adopting the "paid" method assume that over a period of
years this error is insignificant. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde, 34 F. (2d)
185, 200 (W. D. Mo. 1929). Such an assumption seems hazardous, however,
and not conducive to accurate calculations.
25. This method is employed by the Virginia State Corporation Commis-
sion. Commonwealth v. Aetna Insurance Co., supra note 17.
26. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde, 34 F. (2d) 185 (W. D. Mo. 1929); Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Hyde, 315 Mo. 113, 285 S. W. 65 (1926); Bullion v. Aetna
Insurance Co., supra note 15; Commonwealth v. Aetna Insurance Co., cupra
note 17. Contra: Aetna Insurance Co. v. Travis, supra note 18.
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alone would be sufficient to warrant the attraction of new capital to the
enterprise. The only way in which net premiums written can have sig-
nificance is by relation to the return upon the total capital investment.
So fundamental is the concept of a return upon contributed capital as the
measure of reasonableness, that courts and commissions may find them-
selves necessarily drawn to the use of invested capital as a rate base.
Indeed, one court has entirely rejected the principle of net premiums
written in favor of invested capital.27 And the Virginia Corporation
Commission, although employing net premiums written as the base, felt
the need of testing the reasonableness of the rates ordered by determining
whether the proposed underwriting profits, added to investment income,
would yield a reasonable return on "Virginia fire capital, surplus and
undivided profits. ' 28 The selection of invested capital as a rate base,
however, would raise certain problems not presented by the use of net
premiums written. The fact that most of the companies submitting to
state regulation are interstate in character, would necessitate the adoption
of some method of allocating the proper amount of total invested capital
to the state in question. Probably the most accurate measure would be
the ratio of total net premiums to net premiums written within the state." '
Furthermore, the use of invested capital would raise the prudent invest-
ment-present value problem, 30 with all the disadvantages arising from
the confusion now prevalent in the public utility field. However, these
disadvantages might possibly be mitigatqd by the greater ease of valua-
tion in the business of fire insurance. 81
27. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Travis, supra note 18. See note 26, supra.
28. Commonwealth v. Aetna Insurance Co., supra note 17, at 118, 119. The
necessity of resorting to return on invested capital to find a valid measure of
reasonableness is appreciated by writers on the subject of fire insurance rate
regulation. PATTERSON, THE INSURAICEI COIMMISSIONER IN THEl UNITED STATES
(1927) 282; Rumsny, THE STATE AND THF INSURANCEI COMPANY (1914) 12.
29. In the two cases in which the necessity for allocating capital has pre-
sented itself, this method has been employed. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Travis,
supra note 18; Commonwealth v. Aetna Insurance Co., supr note 17.
30. That this would very likely be true is indicated by the opinion in the
one case wherein capital investment has been adopted as the rate base. Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Travis, supra note 18, at 356, 357, 259 Pac. at 1071, 1072.
31. Another criticism of such a rate base has been advanced in Note (1928) 41
HARav. L. Rnyv. 532. It is there contended that the use of capital investment
would discourage insurance companies from seeking additional policyholders,
since the failure of the capital investment to increase commensurately with
the business prevents management from receiving any reward for its efforts
toward expansion. The contention is predicated upon the assumption that
in the insurance business, invested capital remains static after the initial con-
tribution, regardless of the volume of insurance later written, whereas in the
case of the public utilities, capital investment is always roughly commensurate
with the amount of business done. The assumption made, however, is scarcely
accurate as to either utilities or insurance. That in the former there is a
direct relation between the amount of invested capital and the volume of
business done is true only in a limited sense, since utilities operate under
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The selection of an adequate rate of return is of paramount importance
because of the complete dependence of policyholders upon the invested
capital and reserves. To secure a fair and reasonable return, a different
rate would be necessary on net premiums written than on invested capital.
Similarly, a rate allowed on the entire business would be at variance with
a rate established solely on the underwriting division, since if a rate
proper for the entire business were utilized with reference to underwriting
alone, the companies would reap an unreasonable profit through the dis-
regarding of the interest gained on investments.32  There is the
further problem of making provision in the rate for an allowance to
cover losses arising from conflagrations. Such losses cannot be anticipated
in actuarial calculations because of the irregularity of their occurrence.
Allocation of such losses is extremely difficult in that it seems desirable to
apportion them among the several states, rather than to place the burden
entirely upon the state in which the conflagration occurs. The problem
of whether the reward for risk-bearing in the rate embraces this element,
clearly resolves itself into a question of the adequacy of the original
allowance for risk.33
It may be seen that state control of the price of fire insurance has been
attempted under two utterly divergent economic theories. The enforce-
ment of competition through the application of anti-trust legislation has
given way to restriction of competition through rate regulation. But
although enforcement of competition has proven unworkable, restriction
has also failed to give promise of adequate public protection. By the very
conditions of decreasing cost. On the other hand, the surplus set aside by
insurance companies is increased as the amount of insurance outstanding be-
comes greater, and such increased surplus is a proper part of the total invested
capital, for it consists of earnings reinvested in the business by the owners. It
has been considered as a portion of total invested capital in both the cases
wherein the question was relevant. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Travis, supra note
18; Commonwealth v. Aetna Insurance Co., supra note 17. Moreover, in regu-
latory practice the reward of good management, if deemed desirable, is cus-
tomarily secured through a differential allowance in the rate of return. SuTrH,
THE FAm RATE OF REruRN iN PuBLIc UTiLrrY REGULATION (1932) 198.
32. The rate uniformly employed under present regulatory methods which
involve the use of net premiums as a rate base and include in rate regulation
only the underwriting portion of the business, is 5%.
33. The Arkansas court has felt that the 5% basic rate sufficiently covers
the conflagration hazard. Bullion v. Aetna Insurance Co., supra note 15. Ap-
parently the Kansas court has taken the same view; at least no additional
amount was recommended by the referee and there was no further mention of
the matter by the court. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Travis, supra note 13. On
the other hand, the Missouri Supreme Court allowed 3% for this hazard over
the basic 5%; the Federal District Court an additional amount although the
exact percentage is not given; the Virginia State Corporation Commission
2%cl%. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde (both eases), supra note 13; Common-
wealth v. Aetna Insurance Co., supra note 17. The companies have contended
for an allowance of 3%" in addition to the 5% rate.
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complexity of fire insurance, the companies have in great measure been
protected from effective price control. But more important than the pre-
vention of excessive profits, from the standpoint of the policy holders, is
a guaranty of financial stability. Therefore, in proceeding with a program
of regulation about which little is comprehended, there is added to the
problem of avoiding unreasonable profit, the danger that the -very solvency
upon which the public is dependent may be seriously threatened by the
blind application of an untested theory.34
34. One of the most. interesting illustrations of the relation between anti-
trust legislation and rate regulation is the recent situation in Texas, 'where
the insurance companies were held to have violated the anti-trust act by com-
bining to regulate commissions paid to agents, despite the fact that the State
Insurance Commissioner had full power to regulate rates. Potomac Fire In-
surance Co. v. State, 18 IS. W. (2d) 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). The following
year, an order of the Insurance Commission limiting the amount of commissions
to be paid agents was held invalid on the ground that the power 'to set maximum
rates did not carry with it the power to control the elements comprising the rate.
Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. Board of Insurance Commissioners,
34 S. W. (2d) 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
